1997年夏天，一家日本的主要報紙請我就二十世紀(jì)中發(fā)生的最重要的事談?wù)勛约旱目捶�。我發(fā)現(xiàn)這是個很少遇到的引人深思的問題，畢竟在過去的百年當(dāng)中發(fā)生了那么多重大的歷史事件。歐洲的帝國，特別是在十九世紀(jì)中居于支配性地位的英、法帝國，終于沒入了歷史。我們親歷了兩次世界大戰(zhàn)，看到法西斯主義和納粹主義的興起和衰亡。二十世紀(jì)目睹了共產(chǎn)主義的崛起，以及它的沒落（如在前蘇聯(lián)陣營）或大幅度的變革（如在中國）。我們也注意到，西方世界的經(jīng)濟(jì)支配地位已被一種新的經(jīng)濟(jì)格局所取代，在這一新的經(jīng)濟(jì)格局中，日本、東亞和東南亞有著更大的影響力。雖然東亞和東南亞地區(qū)現(xiàn)在正面臨一些金融和經(jīng)濟(jì)問題，但這并不會改變上述的世界經(jīng)濟(jì)格局過去幾十年來的演變態(tài)勢（若觀察日本在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)格局中地位的變化，則其重要性的提升幾可追溯至百年前）。過去的這一百年確實(shí)不乏重要的歷史事件。

　　然而，若要在二十世紀(jì)里發(fā)生的諸多進(jìn)步當(dāng)中選擇一項最重要的，那么，我會毫無困難地指出，那就是民主的興盛。我這樣講，并無意否認(rèn)其他同樣具重要性的歷史事件，但我想指出的是，到了遙遠(yuǎn)的將來，當(dāng)人們回首這個世紀(jì)的歷程時，他們就會發(fā)現(xiàn)，民主制度出現(xiàn)后被廣泛地接納為政府的組成方式，除此之外恐怕沒有比這意義更重大的事了。

　　當(dāng)然，民主的理念實(shí)源于兩千多年前的古希臘，此后各國都嘗試過零星的致力于民主化的努力，印度也是如此[1]。在古希臘，確實(shí)形成并認(rèn)真地實(shí)施過民主的理念（盡管范圍有限），而此后這一實(shí)驗(yàn)卻瓦解了，被更專制、缺乏制衡的政權(quán)取而代之了；
而那時在其他地方則尚未出現(xiàn)過其他任何形式的民主制度。

　　所以，我們所了解的民主制度是經(jīng)過了很長時期才出現(xiàn)的。民主制度作為一種有效的統(tǒng)治方式，它逐漸成長直至最終居于支配地位的過程是由一系列歷史發(fā)展進(jìn)程所組成的。這些事件包括1215年英國的大憲章的簽署，十八世紀(jì)的法國大革命和美國革命，以及十九世紀(jì)在歐洲和北美選舉權(quán)的擴(kuò)大等等。然而，直到二十世紀(jì)，民主的理念才被確立為在任何國家都適用的“常規(guī)的”政府形式──無論在歐洲、美洲、還是亞洲或非洲皆然。

　　關(guān)于民主的思想是一種放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)的理念，它是嶄新的、典范式的二十世紀(jì)的產(chǎn)物。當(dāng)年通過憲章運(yùn)動強(qiáng)制性地限制英國君主權(quán)力的反叛者們，把民主完全視為單純地為其本地需要服務(wù)的理念。相比之下，為美國獨(dú)立而戰(zhàn)的志士們和法國大革命中的革命者則作出了巨大的貢獻(xiàn)，是他們幫助人類懂得了，必須把民主變成在人類社會里通行的制度。不過，他們在實(shí)踐中提出的要求之重點(diǎn)，也仍然有相當(dāng)?shù)牡赜蚓窒扌�，�?shí)際上限于北大西洋的兩岸，而且是以該地區(qū)特殊的經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會和政治歷史為基礎(chǔ)的。

　　在整個的十九世紀(jì)里，民主思想的理論家們覺得，議論一個國家或另一個國家是否“適合于民主制度”是十分自然的事情。直到二十世紀(jì)，這一看法才發(fā)生了變化，人們開始承認(rèn)，這樣提問題本身就是錯誤的：根本不需要去判定一個國家是否適合于民主制度，相反，每個國家都必然在民主化的過程中變成適應(yīng)民主制度的社會。這一變化的確是個重大的變化，它把民主理念潛在的影響擴(kuò)展到了歷史和文化各不相同、富裕程度千差萬別的數(shù)十億人當(dāng)中。

　　也正是在本世紀(jì)，人們最終接受了這樣的理念，所謂的“成人的普選權(quán)”必須包括所有的成年人──不僅僅包括男性，而且也包括女性。今年一月我有幸會見了一位享有盛名的杰出女性、瑞士總統(tǒng)露絲.德雷福斯女士（RuthDreyfuss）。這次會見令我浮想連翩，僅僅在二十五年前，瑞士的婦女還沒有選舉權(quán)呢。我們終于在本世紀(jì)達(dá)成了這樣的共識，民主的舉世普適性就象善行一樣，是不應(yīng)對之加以限制的。

　　我不否認(rèn)，民主價值觀的普適性這一訴求受到著各種挑戰(zhàn)，這些挑戰(zhàn)形式各異，來自不同的方向。實(shí)際上，這正是本文要討論的主題之一。在下文中，我將回顧民主的價值觀放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)的訴求，并分析圍繞著這一訴求的種種爭論。但在進(jìn)一步討論之前，有必要明確地把握這樣一個概念，即在當(dāng)今的世界上民主已經(jīng)成為支配性的信念。

　　在任何時代、任何社會環(huán)境中，都有一些占優(yōu)勢的信念，它們似乎被尊為一種普遍性規(guī)則，就象在計算機(jī)程序中預(yù)設(shè)（default）的安排一樣；
除非這些信念提出的要求以某種方式被完全否定了，否則，在一般情況下這些信念往往被視為是正確的。盡管民主制度尚未成為在所有國家都施行的制度，雖然民主的理念也確實(shí)還未被所有國家一致接受，但按照世界上通行的一般看法，現(xiàn)在民主政治已被視為大體上是正確的選擇。只有那些想抵制民主政治、以便為非民主制度辯護(hù)的人們，還在那里竭力排斥民主的理念。

　　當(dāng)年那些在亞洲或非洲倡導(dǎo)民主的人們曾處于極為艱難的困境當(dāng)中，這并非年代久遠(yuǎn)之事。但自從那時以來，歷史已經(jīng)發(fā)生了巨大的變化。現(xiàn)在，雖然我們有時仍然不得不與那些含蓄或公開地排斥民主政治的人士爭辯，我們也應(yīng)該非常清醒地認(rèn)識到，在政治問題的理解方面，整個的大氣候已經(jīng)與上個世紀(jì)完全不同了。我們再也不用每每辯識，某個國家（比如南非，或柬埔寨、智利）是否“適合于民主政治”（而在十九世紀(jì)的話語當(dāng)中這是個非常典型的問題）；
現(xiàn)在我們早就把這一點(diǎn)視為理所當(dāng)然的了。人類社會已經(jīng)公認(rèn)，民主制度是普遍適用于各國的，民主的價值觀也被視為是放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)的；
這是思想史上的一場重大革命，也是二十世紀(jì)的主要貢獻(xiàn)之一。在這樣的背景下，現(xiàn)在我們來討論為什么民主的價值觀放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)。

　　“印度經(jīng)驗(yàn)”　　

　　究竟民主制度成效如何呢?雖然沒有人真會去質(zhì)疑民主政治在美國或英國、法國的作用，但是，民主政治在世界上的許多貧窮國家里成效如何，卻仍然是個引起爭論的問題。在本文中，我不可能詳細(xì)地檢視歷史記錄，不過，我想指出，民主制度的成效相當(dāng)不錯。

　　如果談到民主政治在貧窮國家里的成效，當(dāng)然，常常會涉及到印度的例子。當(dāng)年，英國殖民當(dāng)局拒絕印度的獨(dú)立要求時，就處處懷疑印度人管理自己的國家和社會的能力。1947年，當(dāng)印度獨(dú)立的時候，這個國家確實(shí)處在某種混亂當(dāng)中。獨(dú)立后的印度政府毫無政治經(jīng)驗(yàn)，印度過去各自分治的地區(qū)之間尚未融合一體，政治上各種力量的分野模糊不清，同時還廣泛存在著社區(qū)性暴力事件和社會失序。那時，對印度未來是否能成為一個統(tǒng)一的、民主的國家，還真缺乏信心。然而，半個世紀(jì)過去了，我們現(xiàn)在可以看到，印度的民主政治歷經(jīng)甘苦，已卓有成效地奠定了鞏固的基礎(chǔ)。在這段時間里，政治上出現(xiàn)的分歧大體上都按照憲法的準(zhǔn)則來處理，并且堅持根據(jù)選舉結(jié)果和國會的規(guī)則來組織歷屆政府。雖然當(dāng)年印度這個國家是由各個差異極大的地區(qū)馬馬虎虎、勉勉強(qiáng)強(qiáng)地倉促組合而成的，但它不但存活了下來，而且，作為一個建立在民主制度基礎(chǔ)上的政治體，運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)得相當(dāng)良好。確實(shí)，印度的各個部份正是通過有效的民主政治體制而結(jié)為一體的。

　　印度的各邦操各種不同的語言、有著多樣化的宗教，在國家的發(fā)展中如何處理這些問題，也構(gòu)成了對印度的生存的巨大挑戰(zhàn)。當(dāng)然，由于宗教和社區(qū)間的差異，印度的政治具有某種特殊的脆弱性，這往往會被宗派政治家所利用，而他們也確實(shí)數(shù)次這樣做過（包括在最近的幾個月里），由此導(dǎo)致了群眾的極大恐懼。不過，當(dāng)宗派性暴力活動乘機(jī)興風(fēng)作浪時，全國各界都會一致譴責(zé)這樣的暴力活動，從而最終維護(hù)著民主制度的基石，以反對狹隘的派系摩擦。印度不僅是居于多數(shù)地位的印度教的故鄉(xiāng)，也是世界上第三大的信奉伊斯蘭教的人口之家鄉(xiāng)，還擁有數(shù)百萬的基督教徒和佛教徒，世界上大多數(shù)的錫克教徒、印度祆教和耆那教徒也都住在印度。對于印度這樣一個差異極大的國家的生存和繁榮來說，這樣的社會共識當(dāng)然是至關(guān)重要的。

　　民主與經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的關(guān)系　

　　人們經(jīng)常會聽到這樣一種觀點(diǎn)，即不民主的體制能更有效地推動經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。這種想法有時被稱為“李氏假設(shè)”，因?yàn)樾录悠碌念I(lǐng)導(dǎo)人、前總統(tǒng)李光耀是它的鼓吹者。確實(shí)，有一些實(shí)行威權(quán)體制的國家（如韓國、李光耀自己的新加坡以及改革后的中國）的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率高于許多非威權(quán)體制的國家（包括印度、牙買加和哥斯達(dá)黎加），從這個意義來講，李光耀當(dāng)然是對的。然而，這個“李氏假設(shè)”是以零星的經(jīng)驗(yàn)觀察為基礎(chǔ)的，是根據(jù)高度選擇性的、有限的信息歸納出來的，它并未經(jīng)過任何以現(xiàn)有的大范圍數(shù)據(jù)為基礎(chǔ)的一般性統(tǒng)計檢驗(yàn)。要證明威權(quán)體制和經(jīng)濟(jì)高增長的關(guān)系具有普遍性意義，就不能用高度選擇性的資料去論證。例如，博茨瓦納是非洲經(jīng)濟(jì)增長紀(jì)錄最好的國家，也是全世界經(jīng)濟(jì)增長紀(jì)錄最好的國家之一，它幾十年來一直是非洲大陸上的一塊民主制度的“沙漠綠洲”；
如果要把新加坡或中國的高經(jīng)濟(jì)增長當(dāng)做威權(quán)主義體制在促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長方面做得更好的“確鑿證據(jù)”，那我們就不能回避從博茨瓦納之例中得出的相反結(jié)論。我們需要做更系統(tǒng)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究，以便從中分辨出支持和反駁“李氏假設(shè)”的證據(jù)。

　　實(shí)際上，并沒有任何令人信服的普遍性證據(jù)能證明，威權(quán)主義的統(tǒng)治和對政治及公民權(quán)利的壓制真的對經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展有益處。確實(shí)，從普遍的統(tǒng)計資料中不可能歸納出這樣的結(jié)論。系統(tǒng)性的經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究（比如由羅伯特.巴若（Robert Barro）或亞當(dāng).普熱沃斯基（AdamPrzeworski）所主持的研究）的結(jié)果從未真正支持過這樣的觀點(diǎn)，即在政治權(quán)利和經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)之間存在著普遍性的沖突。[2]究竟政治權(quán)利對經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)的影響為何，似乎取決于許多其他因素的作用；
某些統(tǒng)計調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)在兩者之間存在著微弱的負(fù)相關(guān)，而另外一些統(tǒng)計研究卻發(fā)現(xiàn)兩者之間有很強(qiáng)的正相關(guān)。如果把所有的比較研究的結(jié)果放在一起，關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長與民主之間沒有明顯的彼此影響的假設(shè)還是相當(dāng)有說服力的。既然民主和政治自由本身非常重要，所以與上述研究相關(guān)的努力決不會遭到忽視。[3]

　　這個問題也涉及到經(jīng)濟(jì)研究方法的一個基本要點(diǎn)。我們不僅應(yīng)當(dāng)從統(tǒng)計上看相關(guān)程度之大小，還應(yīng)當(dāng)考察和分析關(guān)系到經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和發(fā)展的因果性過程�，F(xiàn)在，學(xué)者們已經(jīng)對導(dǎo)致東亞地區(qū)各國經(jīng)濟(jì)成功的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策和環(huán)境因素有相當(dāng)多的了解。雖然不同的經(jīng)驗(yàn)性研究所關(guān)心的重點(diǎn)不一樣，但目前學(xué)者們已經(jīng)就一份對經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展“有助的政策”清單形成了廣泛的共識。在這個政策清單上有開放競爭、利用國際市場、由公共部門對投資和出口提供激勵、高識字率和中小學(xué)入學(xué)率、成功的土地改革以及其他促進(jìn)廣泛參與經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張活動的社會條件等。我們完全沒有理由假設(shè)，這些政策中的任何一項會與更廣泛的民主制度不一致、而只能由象在韓國、新加坡或中國那樣的威權(quán)體制來強(qiáng)力支撐。實(shí)際上，有一項強(qiáng)有力的證據(jù)表明，要形成更快的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，所需要的是一個更寬松的經(jīng)濟(jì)氣氛，而不是一個更嚴(yán)酷的政治體制。

　　要完成這一研究，就必須超越狹隘的關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的觀察，而應(yīng)更寬泛地分析經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展需要些什么，包括經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會保障方面的需要。從這樣的角度出發(fā)，我們就要一方面看政治與公民權(quán)利，另一方面看主要經(jīng)濟(jì)災(zāi)難的預(yù)防，以及兩者之間的關(guān)系。政治與公民權(quán)利能給予人民必要的機(jī)會，以要求政府注意社會上的需要并采取相應(yīng)的行動去滿足這些需要。政府對其人民遭受苦難時的反應(yīng)往往取決于人民施加的壓力。而人民能否行使其政治權(quán)利（如投票、批評、抗議以及其他的類似權(quán)利），確實(shí)直接關(guān)系到政府是否有足夠的激勵去關(guān)心人民的苦難。

　　我在別的地方也提到過一個明顯的事實(shí)，回顧世界上可怕的饑饉史，在任何一個獨(dú)立、民主、擁有相對的新聞自由的國家里，從來沒有發(fā)生過重大的饑饉。[4]不管我們觀察哪個國家，是埃塞俄比亞、索馬里最近的饑饉，還是其他獨(dú)裁政權(quán)下的饑饉；
是蘇聯(lián)三十年代的饑饉，還是中國1958年至1961年大躍進(jìn)失敗后的饑饉；
或更早一些，愛爾蘭或印度在外族統(tǒng)治下的饑饉；
在這個規(guī)律面前，我們找不到任何例外。雖然中國在經(jīng)濟(jì)的許多方面做得比印度好，但中國仍然出現(xiàn)過大范圍的饑饉（而印度卻從未如此），這場饑饉實(shí)際上是世界史上有記錄的饑饉中最大的一次，在1958年至1961年間差不多餓死了三千萬人民，而導(dǎo)致這場饑饉的錯誤的政府政策卻被延續(xù)不變達(dá)三年之久。這些導(dǎo)致人民餓死的政策被推行下去而未受到批評，因?yàn)樽h會里沒有反對黨，沒有新聞自由，也沒有多黨制下的選舉。事實(shí)上，恰恰是因?yàn)槿鄙賹��?zhí)政黨的挑戰(zhàn)，才使得嚴(yán)重錯誤的政策雖然每年殺害了上千萬人，也仍然能夠持續(xù)下去。在世界上此刻正發(fā)生的兩場大饑饉中，一場在北朝鮮，另一場在蘇丹，可以說，也出現(xiàn)了同樣的情形。

　　饑饉經(jīng)�？瓷先ヅc自然災(zāi)害有關(guān)，而新聞記者也常常把饑饉的原因簡單地歸結(jié)為自然災(zāi)害:在失敗了的大躍進(jìn)期間中國出現(xiàn)了洪水災(zāi)害，(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　在埃塞俄比亞有旱災(zāi)，而在北朝鮮則是谷物歉收。然而，許多同樣遭受到類似自然災(zāi)害的國家，甚至其災(zāi)情更重，卻能有效地避免饑饉的發(fā)生。因?yàn)椋瑢�選民負(fù)責(zé)的政府必須積極地采取措施以幫助人民、減輕饑餓的威脅。在一場饑饉中，主要的受害者是窮人，所以政府可以通過創(chuàng)造收入（例如，通過就業(yè)計劃等）、讓潛在的受饑饉威脅的受害者獲取食物，從而使窮人免于餓死。即使是在那些最窮的民主國家里，萬一遇到了嚴(yán)重的旱災(zāi)、水災(zāi)或其他自然災(zāi)害（如印度在1973年，或津巴布韋和博茨瓦納在八十年代前期），政府也能讓人民得到食物而從未出現(xiàn)過饑饉。

　　如果采取認(rèn)真的努力，要避免饑饉其實(shí)是很容易的。而一個民主政府由于必須面對選舉和反對黨及獨(dú)立的報紙的批評，所以除了積極努力地避免饑饉以外別無選擇。處于英國殖民統(tǒng)治下的印度直到獨(dú)立之時都饑饉不斷（最后的一次饑饉發(fā)生在1943年，是印度獨(dú)立前四年的事，那時我還是個孩子，曾目睹了饑饉時期）；
然而，自從印度建立了多黨民主政治和實(shí)現(xiàn)了新聞自由之后，饑饉就突然消失了，這樣的結(jié)果其實(shí)一點(diǎn)也不奇怪。

　　我在其他書著中，特別是在我與讓.德熱茲（Jean Dreze）合作研究的成果中，也談到過這些問題，在這里就不再贅述。[5]避免饑饉實(shí)際上只不過是民主政治可以解決的諸多問題之一，當(dāng)然舉這個例子是最容易的。一般而言，政治和公民權(quán)利的積極作用表現(xiàn)在它有助于防止出現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會性災(zāi)難。如果一個國家諸事順利、一切都走上了軌道，人們或許不會特別注意到民主的這種工具性作用。但當(dāng)形勢因種種原因變壞時，民主政治所提供的政治激勵機(jī)制就顯現(xiàn)出巨大的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。

　　我相信，從中可以得出一個重要的教訓(xùn)，即許多經(jīng)濟(jì)技術(shù)官僚主張使用由市場經(jīng)濟(jì)提供的經(jīng)濟(jì)激勵機(jī)制，但卻忽視由民主政治所保證的政治激勵機(jī)制，這意味著實(shí)行一種極不平衡的制度基礎(chǔ)。當(dāng)一個國家運(yùn)氣不錯、未經(jīng)歷嚴(yán)重的災(zāi)難、一切順利時，民主政治對弱勢群體的保護(hù)性功能可能未必引起人們的重視。然而，當(dāng)經(jīng)濟(jì)或其他環(huán)境發(fā)生變化，或者發(fā)生政策失誤而未予糾正時，由此會產(chǎn)生不安全的危險，這時哪怕一個國家看上去十分正常，其中也可能潛伏著這類危險。

　　最近東亞和東南亞發(fā)生的問題就是實(shí)行不民主的政治制度的一系列懲罰，這在兩個方面表現(xiàn)得特別明顯。首先，在這一地區(qū)的某些國家（包括韓國、泰國、印度尼西亞）里，金融危機(jī)的發(fā)展與商業(yè)上缺乏透明度有極為密切的關(guān)系，特別是在金融運(yùn)作方面缺乏由公眾參與的監(jiān)督。沒有有效的民主制度下的輿論監(jiān)督是導(dǎo)致這場金融危機(jī)的核心原因。其次，一旦這場金融危機(jī)導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟(jì)全面衰退時，在印度尼西亞這樣的國家里，民主制度對弱勢群體的保護(hù)性功能方面的真空就顯得極為突出了，這與民主國家可避免饑饉是同樣的道理。在印度尼西亞，很多人被這場經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退剝奪而生機(jī)困難，當(dāng)權(quán)者卻根本不理睬他們的訴求。

　　這些國家在過去的幾十年里年平均經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率都達(dá)到了百分之五至十，也許在金融危機(jī)中國民生產(chǎn)總值跌落百分之十看上去并沒有什么大不了的，但是若經(jīng)濟(jì)收縮的負(fù)擔(dān)不是由全社會分擔(dān)，而是集中壓在承受力最低的失業(yè)者或社會上的過剩勞工身上，那么，哪怕經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率只下降百分之十，也會使數(shù)百萬人陷入悲慘境地，甚至奪去人們的生命。在印度尼西亞的情勢一帆風(fēng)順時，這些社會地位脆弱的人們或許不覺得沒有民主會如何影響他們的生活，但在沒有民主的社會里他們的聲音被壓抑住了，而危機(jī)來臨時所帶來的沉重代價就會輕易地壓倒他們。在最需要民主政治對弱勢群體的保護(hù)性功能發(fā)揮作用時，他們才體會到了沒有民主政治的悲哀。

　　民主的各種功能　

　　以上討論主要是回應(yīng)對民主政治的批評，特別是回答了經(jīng)濟(jì)中心論者的批評。下面，我將回到與民主政治的批評者的爭論，側(cè)重于回答文化差異論。不過，現(xiàn)在我準(zhǔn)備先從正面進(jìn)一步分析民主政治的特點(diǎn)，并說明為什么民主的價值觀放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)。

　　究竟什么是民主呢?我們不能把民主等同于多數(shù)人的統(tǒng)治。民主政治所提出的要求是多方面的，其中當(dāng)然包括投票以及尊重選舉結(jié)果，但民主也要求保護(hù)各種自由權(quán)利、尊重立法機(jī)構(gòu)、保障言論自由以及發(fā)布新聞和公正評論而不受政府檢查。如果在選舉中不同黨派未能得到充份機(jī)會表達(dá)自己的立場，或者選民沒有獲得新聞的自由、也無法自由地考慮不同候選人的觀點(diǎn)，那么即使有例行的選舉，這樣的選舉也是弊端重重的。民主政治需要一整套機(jī)制，它并非一個孤立的、機(jī)械的由多數(shù)人實(shí)行統(tǒng)治之類的原則。

　　從這一角度來看，民主政治的優(yōu)點(diǎn)以及它放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)的價值觀反映出人類社會中一些獨(dú)到的德行，這在其充份的實(shí)踐中得到了體現(xiàn)。事實(shí)上，我們可以提出，民主政治從三個方面豐富了民主社會公民的生活。首先，政治自由是人類一般自由的組成部份，而作為社會成員的個人的幸福生活當(dāng)中，關(guān)鍵的一個部份就是行使公民和政治權(quán)利。政治和社會參與在人類的生存和生活里具有內(nèi)在的價值。而阻撓人們參與社會政治生活實(shí)際上是對人們的一大剝奪。其次，如上所言（我曾與那種認(rèn)為民主與經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展相互沖突的觀點(diǎn)爭論過），民主具有一種重要的工具性價值，能促使當(dāng)政者傾聽民眾所表達(dá)出來的要求（包括經(jīng)濟(jì)方面的要求）。再次，民主的實(shí)踐給公民們一個互相學(xué)習(xí)的機(jī)會，從而有助于在社會中形成價值觀、并明確各類問題的優(yōu)先順序，這個問題尚待進(jìn)一步探討。即使是“需求”這樣一個簡單的概念（包括對“經(jīng)濟(jì)方面的需求”的理解），也需要在公眾中展開討論，需要交換不同的信息、觀點(diǎn)和判斷。由此可見，民主除了是公民生活中的內(nèi)在價值、在政治決策中具有工具性價值外，它還具有重要的建設(shè)性價值。當(dāng)我們講到民主是放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)的價值觀時，必須同時考慮到民主在這三方面的貢獻(xiàn)。

　　若要把“需求”（包括“經(jīng)濟(jì)需求”）所包含的內(nèi)容加以概念化、甚至綜合化，本身就需要行使政治和公民權(quán)利。欲恰當(dāng)?shù)亓私饨?jīng)濟(jì)需求的涵義（其內(nèi)容及影響），就需要在社會成員之間展開討論并彼此交換意見。在產(chǎn)生資訊充份、深思熟慮之選擇的過程里，政治和公民權(quán)利，特別是那些與保障言論、爭辯、批評及持異議的自由有關(guān)的權(quán)利，是核心的條件。在社會的價值形成和決定各項需要的優(yōu)先順序時，上述過程是至關(guān)重要的；
一般來說，我們不能把大眾的各種偏好視為既定的、與公眾的討論無關(guān)，不能無視在一個社會中當(dāng)局是否允許有公開的意見交換和爭論。

　　實(shí)際上，在評估社會和政治問題時，公開對話的范圍和效用常常被低估了。例如，許多發(fā)展中國家都存在著生育率過高的問題，在公眾中組織相關(guān)討論可以卓有成效地降低生育率。在印度有大量證據(jù)證明，在識字率較高的邦，組織公眾討論高生育率對社區(qū)、特別是對青年婦女的生命的不良影響，對這些地區(qū)生育率的大幅度下降有明顯作用。如果說，在印度的克拉拉邦或塔米爾.那都邦，現(xiàn)在出現(xiàn)了小型家庭是現(xiàn)代社會的幸福家庭這樣的觀念，這無疑要?dú)w功于一系列相關(guān)的公眾討論和爭辯�？死�拉邦現(xiàn)在的生育率是1.7（與英國和法國相同，比中國的1.9還低），實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)完全未使用任何強(qiáng)制性手段，而是主要依靠一種新的價值觀的出現(xiàn)──在這一價值觀的形成過程中政治和社會對話扮演了重要的作用。而克拉拉邦的高識字率（比中國的任何省份都高），特別是婦女識字率，則是這種社會和政治對話的重要的前提條件。

　　人類社會里曾出現(xiàn)過各種各樣的苦難和剝奪現(xiàn)象，其中有一些可以比較容易地通過社會手段而消除掉。當(dāng)我們衡量人類自身的“需求”時，應(yīng)該充份考慮到人類社會中仍然存在著的種種困苦境遇。例如，我們會覺得世界上有許多東西值得追求，一旦可行的話我們也會把這些視為一種需求。我們甚至?xí)�想到“長生不老”，就象西天的佛那樣用上三千年時間去探討經(jīng)書中的奧秘。但是，我們畢竟不會把“長生不老”看成是自己的“需求”，因?yàn)槟呛苊黠@是不可能的。我們了解有些剝奪現(xiàn)象是可以預(yù)防的，也懂得如何這樣做，而我們關(guān)于需求的概念是與此密切相關(guān)的。在關(guān)于哪些事是可行的（特別是從社會的角度來看是否可行）這類問題上，我們要形成共識和信念，就需要借重公眾討論。政治權(quán)利，包括言論和討論的自由，不僅在產(chǎn)生對需求的社會認(rèn)知時是關(guān)鍵性的，而且在確定經(jīng)濟(jì)需求的含義時也是至關(guān)重要的。

　　民主價值觀的普適性　

　　如果以上的分析是對的，那么，民主的訴求之所以有高度的價值，就不僅僅是基于它具有某一特殊的優(yōu)點(diǎn)。民主的優(yōu)長是多方面的:首先，自由和政治參與在人類生活中具有內(nèi)在的重要性；
其次，民主是一種重要的工具，能產(chǎn)生激勵而令政府面向其公民并對他們負(fù)責(zé)；
再次，在形成價值觀念以及形成民眾對需求、權(quán)利和責(zé)任的理解的過程中，民主具有建設(shè)性的作用。根據(jù)這一判斷，現(xiàn)在我們可以提出本文欲表達(dá)的核心問題，即為什么說民主的價值觀放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)。

　　在關(guān)于這一問題的爭論中，有一種看法認(rèn)為，并非人人都認(rèn)同民主的絕對重要性，若把民主與其他我們關(guān)心和忠于之事相比，尤其如此。這確實(shí)是事實(shí)，在此問題上人類并無完全的共識。而在有些人看來，這種缺乏共識的現(xiàn)象就充份證明，民主的價值觀并不具普適性。

　　顯然，我們必須從方法論方面的問題入手討論下去:到底什么是具普適性的價值呢?若有一種價值被視為有普適性，那么這是否就意味著人人都得對此價值表示贊同呢?如果確實(shí)必得如此，則世界上恐怕就沒有什么具普適性的價值了。據(jù)我所知，世界上沒有哪種價值未曾被人反對過，即便是對母愛大概也不例外。我認(rèn)為，如果某些理念具有普適性意義，那并不需要所有的人都一致贊同，所謂的價值的普適性，其實(shí)就是指任何地方的人都有理由視之為有價值的理念。

　　當(dāng)甘地宣揚(yáng)他的非暴力理念是普適價值時，他并不認(rèn)為世界各地的人們都已按此理念行事，而是相信人們有充份的理由承認(rèn)這一理念是有價值的。同樣地，當(dāng)泰戈爾提出“思想自由”是普適價值時，他并沒有說人人都接受了這一觀念，他的意思是，人人都有足夠的理由去接受這一理念，而泰戈爾畢生都在為探求、表述和傳播這樣的理由而努力。[6]從這一角度去理解，任何關(guān)于某理念具普適價值的主張都會涉及到一些反事實(shí)的分析（counterfactualanalysis）。特別是當(dāng)人們對這樣的主張尚未充份思考之時，他們未必會從中發(fā)現(xiàn)其價值。不光是在民主的價值普適性問題上，所有關(guān)于普適性價值的主張都有這樣的隱含性前提假設(shè)。

　　我想說明的是，在二十世紀(jì)里所發(fā)生的最大的對民主的態(tài)度之轉(zhuǎn)變，正是與這個常見的隱含性前提假設(shè)相關(guān)的。當(dāng)考慮到一個國家尚未實(shí)行民主政治、那里的民眾也沒有機(jī)會實(shí)踐它時，現(xiàn)在通常會假定，一旦民主政治在那里變成現(xiàn)實(shí)時，人民就會認(rèn)同它。而在十九世紀(jì)，典型的情況是不會采用這樣的假設(shè)，而那時被視為很自然的看法（恰如我前面提到的那種預(yù)設(shè)式（default））在二十世紀(jì)里卻發(fā)生了急劇的變化。

　　同時也應(yīng)注意到，這一變化在很大程度上是建立在觀察二十世紀(jì)歷史的基礎(chǔ)之上的。隨著民主的擴(kuò)展，民主制度的支持者就必然越來越多，而不是日益減少。民主制度從歐洲和美洲發(fā)源，伸展到世界上的許多遙遠(yuǎn)的角落，在那里人民積極地參與到民主政治當(dāng)中去并接受了這一制度。不僅如此，一旦某一現(xiàn)存的民主制度被推翻，即使抗議這一政治變化的活動常常遭到粗暴的鎮(zhèn)壓，廣泛的抗議活動也仍然會此起彼伏地出現(xiàn)，許多人寧可冒著生命危險也要為恢復(fù)民主而戰(zhàn)。

　　有一些人質(zhì)疑民主的價值普適性，其理由并不是民主未得到所有人的贊同，而是各國的國情不同。他們所講的不同國情有時是指一些國家的貧窮狀態(tài)。他們的觀點(diǎn)是，窮人感興趣的和關(guān)心的是面包而不是民主。這種時常聽得到的說法有兩大層面的錯誤。

　　首先，正如以上所言，對窮人來說，民主的保護(hù)性作用顯得特別重要。當(dāng)饑荒的受害者面臨饑餓的威脅時，這是非常明顯的；
對那些被金融危機(jī)從經(jīng)濟(jì)階梯上甩下來的貧民來說，也是如此。有經(jīng)濟(jì)方面需要的人民同樣需要在政治上發(fā)出自己的聲音。民主并不是一種非得達(dá)到普遍富裕后才可享用的奢侈品。

　　其次，幾乎沒有證據(jù)能證明，如果窮人有選擇的話，他們寧可拒絕民主。有一個值得引起注意的事例，七十年代中期的印度政府曾試圖用同樣的觀點(diǎn)為它宣布的“緊急狀態(tài)”（以及對政治和公民權(quán)利的壓制）辯護(hù)，在隨后的選舉中選民們圍繞著這一問題分成了兩個陣營。對印度的民主制度來說，這是一場命運(yùn)攸關(guān)的選舉，選舉中主要的爭議就是實(shí)施“緊急狀態(tài)”的問題。結(jié)果，雖然印度也許是世界上最貧窮的國家之一，但印度選民們的多數(shù)堅定地拒絕了政府壓制政治和公民權(quán)利的企圖，(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　他們挺身抗議政府忽視民眾的自由和權(quán)利的做法，并未把注意力放在抱怨經(jīng)濟(jì)剝奪方面。

　　印度的現(xiàn)實(shí)完全駁斥了這種窮人不在乎公民和政治權(quán)利的說法。若觀察韓國、泰國、孟加拉、巴基斯坦、緬甸、印度尼西亞以及亞洲其他國家爭取民主自由的斗爭，結(jié)論也并無二致。同樣地，雖然非洲的許多政府排拒政治自由，一旦條件允許，那里就會出現(xiàn)反對政治壓迫的各種運(yùn)動和抗議活動。

　　關(guān)于文化差異問題的爭論　

　　還有一種觀點(diǎn)也強(qiáng)調(diào)民主有明顯的地區(qū)差異性，它談的不是經(jīng)濟(jì)條件，而是文化上的差異，或許其中最著名的就是所謂的“亞洲價值觀”。這種觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，亞洲人傳統(tǒng)上高度評價紀(jì)律，而不重視自由；
所以，與其他國家的人相比，亞洲人不可避免地會對民主制度持更為懷疑的態(tài)度。我在卡內(nèi)基基金會關(guān)于倫理和國際事務(wù)的摩根索紀(jì)念講座中曾比較詳細(xì)地談過這個問題。[7]

　　從亞洲文化的歷史中，特別是考察印度、中東、伊朗和亞洲其他國家的古典傳統(tǒng)，很難找到任何支持這一觀點(diǎn)的根據(jù)。例如，在公元前三世紀(jì)的印度帝王Ashoka的銘文中，就可以發(fā)現(xiàn)主張容忍多元主義和國家有責(zé)任保護(hù)少數(shù)的最早、最明確的記載。

　　當(dāng)然，亞洲面積廣袤，人口占世界人口的百分之六十，很難就這樣一個地區(qū)的不同民族下一個一般性的結(jié)論。有時，“亞洲價值”的鼓吹者往往會主要把東亞當(dāng)作這一觀點(diǎn)的適用地域，一般是把泰國以東的亞洲國家與西方作對比，不過也有人提出過更令人懷疑的觀點(diǎn)，即亞洲的其他國家也是十分“相似”的。我們應(yīng)當(dāng)感謝李光耀，因?yàn)樗�明確地解釋了下述觀點(diǎn)（也就相關(guān)的紛亂雜陳、表述含混的說法清晰地提出了他的說明）。當(dāng)李光耀說明“西方和東亞在社會和政府的概念上完全不同”時，他解釋說，“當(dāng)我提到東亞時，我指的是韓國、日本、中國、越南，它們與東南亞不同，后者是一個中國和印度文化的混合物，不過印度文化本身也強(qiáng)調(diào)同樣的價值觀”。[8]

　　然而，即便只考慮到東亞地區(qū)，這一地區(qū)也是千差萬別的，不僅在日本、中國、韓國及這一地區(qū)的其他國家之間存在著許多差異，而且在每個國家內(nèi)部也有很多差異。在詮釋“亞洲價值”時，學(xué)者們往往引用孔子的話，但在這些國家里對文化產(chǎn)生過影響的并不止孔子一人（例如，在日本、中國、韓國，佛教的文化傳統(tǒng)既古老且深遠(yuǎn)，其強(qiáng)大的影響曾綿延達(dá)一千五百多年，此外，這些國家還受到了包括基督教在內(nèi)的其他影響）。在所有這些文化傳統(tǒng)中，沒有哪一種曾一貫如一地鼓吹對秩序的崇尚比對自由的崇尚更重要。

　　更進(jìn)一步看，孔子本人也并不主張對國家的盲目崇拜。當(dāng)子路問孔子，“應(yīng)當(dāng)如何為君王服務(wù)”時，孔子回答說，“告訴君王真話，別管是不是會冒犯他”。（【譯者注】《論語.憲問篇》云，子路問事君，子曰:“勿欺也而犯之”。）[9]孔子的這一回答可能值得威權(quán)政權(quán)的新聞檢查官深思�？鬃硬⒉环磳χ�(jǐn)慎從事、講究策略，但（如果策略上必要的話）卻不會姑息一個壞政府。他說:“如果政府的表現(xiàn)良好，就要大膽地說話行事；
如果政府的表現(xiàn)不好，要行事勇敢但說話溫和。”（【譯者注】《論語.憲問篇》云，“邦有道，危言危行；
邦無道，危行言遜”。）[10]

　　想象中的所謂亞洲價值這座大廈的兩大支柱是對家庭的忠誠（【譯者注】即“孝”）和對國家的服從（【譯者注】即“忠”），而孔子的確曾明確地指出這樣的事實(shí)，即這兩者彼此之間可能發(fā)生嚴(yán)重的沖突。許多亞洲價值的鼓吹者把國家的作用視為家庭作用的延伸，但正如孔子所說的，這兩者其實(shí)是相互矛盾的。葉公對孔子說：“我的族人中有一個人剛直不阿，他父親偷了一只羊，于是他就譴責(zé)父親。”孔子答道：“在我的族人中，正直的人行事方法不同:父親為兒子遮掩，兒子為父親遮掩，這樣做也是正直的�！保ā咀g者注】《論語.子路篇》：葉公語孔子曰：“吾黨有直躬者，其父攘羊，而子證之�！笨鬃釉唬骸拔狳h之直者異于是，父為子隱，子為父隱，直在其中矣�！保�[11]

　　把亞洲價值籠而統(tǒng)之地說成是反對民主和政治權(quán)利的，其實(shí)經(jīng)不起嚴(yán)格推敲。我想，既然提出所謂的亞洲價值的那些人并不是學(xué)者，而是些政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，他們經(jīng)常扮演著威權(quán)政府的官方或非官方發(fā)言人，所以我不應(yīng)該對這種缺乏學(xué)術(shù)論據(jù)的觀點(diǎn)過于苛求。不過，有趣的是，我們學(xué)者考慮現(xiàn)實(shí)政治問題時可能會不那么實(shí)際，而現(xiàn)實(shí)政治家則用不實(shí)事求是的態(tài)度來對待學(xué)術(shù)問題。

　　當(dāng)然，要在亞洲的傳統(tǒng)中找到威權(quán)主義式的說法并非難事。但是，在西方的經(jīng)典文獻(xiàn)中也不難發(fā)現(xiàn)這樣的論述。只要查一下柏拉圖（Plato）和阿奎那（Aquinas）的著作就會發(fā)現(xiàn)，崇尚紀(jì)律并非亞洲國家獨(dú)有的主張。若僅僅因?yàn)閬喼迖�家的一些述著中�?qiáng)調(diào)了紀(jì)律和秩序，就否認(rèn)民主的價值觀所可能具有的普適性，就好比僅僅根據(jù)柏拉圖和阿奎那的著作（姑且不提大量的歐洲中世紀(jì)文獻(xiàn)曾支持天主教審判異端的宗教法庭），就要否定民主制度是歐洲和美國政府的一種自然形式。

　　人們基于當(dāng)代、特別是中東地區(qū)政治摩擦的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，往往把伊斯蘭文化描繪成根本不容忍個人自由、甚至排拒個人自由的一種傳統(tǒng)。但是，正象在其他文化傳統(tǒng)中一樣，伊斯蘭文化其實(shí)也充滿了差異性和多樣性。在印度，阿克巴（Akbar）和大多數(shù)莫臥爾王朝（Moghul）的其他帝王在理論和實(shí)踐上所表現(xiàn)出的政治和宗教方面的寬容就可算是個典范（只有Aurangzeb是個明顯的例外）。土耳其的帝王們常常比他們同時代的歐洲帝王們寬容得多。在開羅和巴格達(dá)的統(tǒng)治者那里也可以發(fā)現(xiàn)大量的例子。實(shí)際上，十二世紀(jì)偉大的猶太學(xué)者M(jìn)aimonides曾被迫逃離毫無寬容精神的歐洲（那里本是他的出生地），以逃避歐洲對猶太人的迫害，最后在薩拉丁（Saladin）蘇丹的庇護(hù)下，這個猶太學(xué)者才在寬容禮貌的開羅找到了避風(fēng)港。

　　多樣性是世界上多數(shù)文化的一個特徵，西方的文明亦非例外。民主的實(shí)踐之所以能在現(xiàn)代的西方國家贏得勝利，很大程度上是自文藝復(fù)興和工業(yè)革命以來、特別是過去的一個世紀(jì)中所出現(xiàn)的共識之碩果。若把這一進(jìn)步理解成過去一千年來西方社會追求民主的一項歷史使命，然后再把它與非西方社會的傳統(tǒng)相比（并籠而統(tǒng)之地看待每個非西方的傳統(tǒng)），那將是個極大的錯誤。這種過于簡單化的傾向不僅僅存在于亞洲國家一些政府發(fā)言人的表述當(dāng)中，也存在于某些西方的著名學(xué)者的著作當(dāng)中。

　　下面，讓我舉一位重要學(xué)者的文章為例，塞謬爾.杭廷頓（SamuelHuntington）的著作曾在許多方面給人留下了深刻的印象，但他關(guān)于文明之沖突的論文卻未充份注意到每一種文化內(nèi)部的差異。他的研究導(dǎo)出了明確的結(jié)論，西方國家“對個體主義的偏好以及追求權(quán)利及自由的傳統(tǒng)”是“文明社會所獨(dú)有的”。[12]杭廷頓還認(rèn)為，“西方社會核心特徵的存在決定了西方的現(xiàn)代化的出現(xiàn)，而這些特徵與其他的文明顯然不同”。他的看法是，“早在西方進(jìn)入現(xiàn)代化之前，西方就表現(xiàn)出其不同于其他文明的特徵”。[13] 我認(rèn)為，從歷史的角度來看，這篇論文顯然漏洞百出。

　　每當(dāng)我們看到有亞洲國家的政府發(fā)言人試圖把所謂的“亞洲價值”拿來與所謂的西方觀念對比時，似乎就也有西方的知識分子試圖從另一端作相同的比較。即使每次亞洲國家對“亞洲價值”的強(qiáng)調(diào)都能與西方知識分子的對應(yīng)詮釋相匹配，這也絲毫不能削弱民主的價值普適性。

　　結(jié)語

　　我在本文中曾涉獵了不少與民主的價值普適性相關(guān)的問題。民主的價值觀包括這樣一些內(nèi)容，民主在人類的生活中具有內(nèi)在的重要性，民主在產(chǎn)生政治激勵方面具有工具性作用，民主在形成社會價值體系（以及關(guān)于需求、權(quán)利和責(zé)任的力量與可行度的理解）的過程中具有建設(shè)性功能。這些非常寶貴的特徵并不受地域的局限，也不會被鼓吹紀(jì)律和秩序的主張所抑制。差不多所有的主要文化其內(nèi)部都具有價值體系方面的多樣性。所以，關(guān)于文化上的差異之爭論并不能阻止我們、也不能約束我們?nèi)ミx擇當(dāng)今的政治制度。

　　考慮到當(dāng)代世界賴以生存的民主制度的種種功能性作用，選擇這樣的政治制度應(yīng)該是時不我待的。我一直強(qiáng)調(diào)，民主制度的生命力確實(shí)非常強(qiáng)盛，絕不是在某些地區(qū)偶然出現(xiàn)的個案。民主的價值觀之所以放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)，其影響力最終來源于民主制度的生命力。這就是關(guān)于民主價值的普適性所強(qiáng)調(diào)的根本之點(diǎn)。任何想象出來的文化上的清規(guī)戒律，或者根據(jù)人類復(fù)雜多樣的過去而假設(shè)出來的各種文明當(dāng)中的預(yù)設(shè)框架，都不可能抹殺民主制度及其價值。

　　【編者注】

　　本文以作者去年二月在印度新德里舉行的關(guān)于“建立全球范圍的民主運(yùn)動”會議上的主題演講為基礎(chǔ)，也采用了他去年的新著《自由：發(fā)展的目的和手段（Development asFreedom）》一書中的觀點(diǎn)。原文載于Journal of Democracy(Vol.10, No.3(July 1999):3-17(The John Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment forDemocracy"s International Forum for DemocraticStudies)。本刊編輯部獲該刊許可翻譯轉(zhuǎn)載，并將于下期雜志刊登介紹該作者新著《自由：發(fā)展的目的和手段》的書評。

　　【注釋】　

　　[1] 在Aldous Huxley的小說PointCounterPoint中，在近代的印度，一位丈夫告訴妻子，他必須遠(yuǎn)行去倫敦的大英博物館，以便到那里的圖書館里學(xué)習(xí)民主，而實(shí)際上他卻是去與情婦會面。那時在印度一個對妻子不忠的丈夫就已知道，出門去學(xué)習(xí)民主是個欺騙妻子的巧妙理由。

　　[2] Adam Przeworski, et al.,Sustainable Democracy（可支撐的民主）（Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1995）；
Robert J. Barro, Getting It Right: Markets and Choices in a FreeSociety（促其歸正:自由社會中的市場和選擇）（Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996）.

　　[3] 在我的新書Development as Freedom當(dāng)中，我也考察了有關(guān)這一問題的經(jīng)驗(yàn)性證據(jù)和因果關(guān)聯(lián)的某些細(xì)節(jié)。

　　[4] 見我的文章"Development: Which Way Now?" Economic Journal 93 (December1983)；
Resources, Values, and Development (Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversity Press, 1984)；
及我的文章"Rationality and Social Choice,"我作為學(xué)會主席在美國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會年會上的報告，發(fā)表于American Economic Review (March, 1995)。也參見JeanDreze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1987)；
Frances D"Souza, ed., Starving in Silence: A Report onFamine and Censorship (London: Article 19 International Center onCensorship, 1990)；
Human Rights Watch, Indivisible Human Rights: TheRelationship between Political and Civil Rights to Survival,Subsistence and Poverty (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992)；
andInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, WorldDisaster Report 1994 (Geneva: Red Cross, 1994).

　　[5] Dreze and Sen, Hunger and Public Action.

　　[6] 見我的文章“泰戈爾和他的印度（Tagore and His India）”，(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　載New York Review of Books, 26 June, 1997.

　　[7] Amartya Sen, “Human Rights and Asian Values," Morgenthau MemorialLecture（New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs,1997）, published in a shortened form in The New Republic, 14-21 July1997.

　　[8] Fareed Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," Foreign Affairs 73（March-April 1994）: 113.

　　[9] 《論語.憲問篇第十四》（The Analects of Confucius, Simon Leys, trans.（New York: Norton, 1997）, 14.22, 70）。

　　[10] 《論語.憲問篇第十四》（The Analects of Confucius, 14.3, 66）。

　　[11] 《論語.子路篇第十三》（The Analects of Confucius, 13.18, 63。

　　[12] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order（New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996）, 71.

　　[13] Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 69.

　　當(dāng)代中國研究 [2000年]　[第2期(總第69期)]　

　　Democracy as a Universal Value

　　Amartya Sen

　　--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

　　In the summer of 1997, I was asked by a leading Japanese newspaperwhat I thought was the most important thing that had happened in thetwentieth century. I found this to be an unusually thought-provokingquestion, since so many things of gravity have happened over the lasthundred years. The European empires, especially the British and Frenchones that had so dominated the nineteenth century, came to an end. Wewitnessed two world wars. We saw the rise and fall of fascism andNazism. The century witnessed the rise of communism, and its fall (asin the former Soviet bloc) or radical transformation (as in China). Wealso saw a shift from the economic dominance of the West to a neweconomic balance much more dominated by Japan and East and SoutheastAsia. Even though that region is going through some financial andeconomic problems right now, this is not going to nullify the shift inthe balance of the world economy that has occurred over many decades(in the case of Japan, through nearly the entire century). The pasthundred years are not lacking in important events.

　　Nevertheless, among the great variety of developments that haveoccurred in the twentieth century, I did not, ultimately, have anydifficulty in choosing one as the preeminent development of the period:the rise of democracy. This is not to deny that other occurrences have[End Page 3] also been important, but I would argue that in the distantfuture, when people look back at what happened in this century, theywill find it difficult not to accord primacy to the emergence ofdemocracy as the preeminently acceptable form of governance.

　　The idea of democracy originated, of course, in ancient Greece, morethan two millennia ago. Piecemeal efforts at democratization wereattempted elsewhere as well, including in India.1 But it is really inancient Greece that the idea of democracy took shape and was seriouslyput into practice (albeit on a limited scale), before it collapsed andwas replaced by more authoritarian and asymmetric forms of government.There were no other kinds anywhere else.

　　Thereafter, democracy as we know it took a long time to emerge. Itsgradual--and ultimately triumphant--emergence as a working system ofgovernance was bolstered by many developments, from the signing of theMagna Carta in 1215, to the French and the American Revolutions in theeighteenth century, to the widening of the franchise in Europe andNorth America in the nineteenth century. It was in the twentiethcentury, however, that the idea of democracy became established as the"normal" form of government to which any nation is entitled--whether inEurope, America, Asia, or Africa.

　　The idea of democracy as a universal commitment is quite new, and itis quintessentially a product of the twentieth century. The rebels whoforced restraint on the king of England through the Magna Carta saw theneed as an entirely local one. In contrast, the American fighters forindependence and the revolutionaries in France contributed greatly toan understanding of the need for democracy as a general system. Yet thefocus of their practical demands remained quite local--confined, ineffect, to the two sides of the North Atlantic, and founded on thespecial economic, social, and political history of the region.

　　Throughout the nineteenth century, theorists of democracy found itquite natural to discuss whether one country or another was "fit fordemocracy." This thinking changed only in the twentieth century, withthe recognition that the question itself was wrong: A country does nothave to be deemed fit for democracy; rather, it has to become fitthrough democracy. This is indeed a momentous change, extending thepotential reach of democracy to cover billions of people, with theirvarying histories and cultures and disparate levels of affluence.

　　It was also in this century that people finally accepted that"franchise for all adults" must mean all--not just men but also women.When in January of this year I had the opportunity to meet RuthDreyfuss, the president of Switzerland and a woman of remarkabledistinction,(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　 it gave me occasion to recollect that only a quartercentury ago Swiss women could not even vote. We have at last reachedthe point of recognizing that the coverage of universality, like thequality of mercy, is not strained. [End Page 4]

　　I do not deny that there are challenges to democracy"s claim touniversality. These challenges come in many shapes and forms--and fromdifferent directions. Indeed, that is part of the subject of thisessay. I have to examine the claim of democracy as a universal valueand the disputes that surround that claim. Before I begin thatexercise, however, it is necessary to grasp clearly the sense in whichdemocracy has become a dominant belief in the contemporary world.

　　In any age and social climate, there are some sweeping beliefs thatseem to command respect as a kind of general rule--like a "default"setting in a computer program; they are considered right unless theirclaim is somehow precisely negated. While democracy is not yetuniversally practiced, nor indeed uniformly accepted, in the generalclimate of world opinion, democratic governance has now achieved thestatus of being taken to be generally right. The ball is very much inthe court of those who want to rubbish democracy to providejustification for that rejection.

　　This is a historic change from not very long ago, when the advocatesof democracy for Asia or Africa had to argue for democracy with theirbacks to the wall. While we still have reason enough to dispute thosewho, implicitly or explicitly, reject the need for democracy, we mustalso note clearly how the general climate of opinion has shifted fromwhat it was in previous centuries. We do not have to establish afresh,each time, whether such and such a country (South Africa, or Cambodia,or Chile) is "fit for democracy" (a question that was prominent in thediscourse of the nineteenth century); we now take that for granted.This recognition of democracy as a universally relevant system, whichmoves in the direction of its acceptance as a universal value, is amajor revolution in thinking, and one of the main contributions of thetwentieth century. It is in this context that we have to examine thequestion of democracy as a universal value.

　　The Indian Experience

　　How well has democracy worked? While noone really questions the role of democracy in, say, the United Statesor Britain or France, it is still a matter of dispute for many of thepoorer countries in the world. This is not the occasion for a detailedexamination of the historical record, but I would argue that democracyhas worked well enough.

　　India, of course, was one of the major battlegrounds of this debate.In denying Indians independence, the British expressed anxiety over theIndians" ability to govern themselves. India was indeed in somedisarray in 1947, the year it became independent. It had an untriedgovernment, an undigested partition, and unclear political alignments,combined with widespread communal violence and social disorder. It washard to have faith in the future of a united and democratic India. [EndPage 5] And yet, half a century later, we find a democracy that has,taking the rough with the smooth, worked remarkably well. Politicaldifferences have been largely tackled within the constitutionalguidelines, and governments have risen and fallen according toelectoral and parliamentary rules. An ungainly, unlikely, inelegantcombination of differences, India nonetheless survives and functionsremarkably well as a political unit with a democratic system. Indeed,it is held together by its working democracy.

　　India has also survived the tremendous challenge of dealing with avariety of major languages and a spectrum of religions. Religious andcommunal differences are, of course, vulnerable to exploitation bysectarian politicians, and have indeed been so used on severaloccasions (including in recent months), causing massive consternationin the country. Yet the fact that consternation greets sectarianviolence and that condemnation of such violence comes from all sectionsof the country ultimately provides the main democratic guaranteeagainst the narrowly factional exploitation of sectarianism. This is,of course, essential for the survival and prosperity of a country asremarkably varied as India, which is home not only to a Hindu majority,but to the world"s third largest Muslim population, to millions ofChristians and Buddhists, and to most of the world"s Sikhs, Parsees,and Jains.

　　Democracy and Economic Development

　　It is often claimed thatnondemocratic systems are better at bringing about economicdevelopment. This belief sometimes goes by the name of "the Leehypothesis," due to its advocacy by Lee Kuan Yew, the leader and formerpresident of Singapore. He is certainly right that some disciplinarianstates (such as South Korea, his own Singapore, and postreform China)have had faster rates of economic growth than many less authoritarianones (including India, Jamaica, and Costa Rica). The "Lee hypothesis,"however, is based on sporadic empiricism,(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　 drawing on very selective andlimited information, rather than on any general statistical testingover the wide-ranging data that are available. A general relation ofthis kind cannot be established on the basis of very selectiveevidence. For example, we cannot really take the high economic growthof Singapore or China as "definitive proof" that authoritarianism doesbetter in promoting economic growth, any more than we can draw theopposite conclusion from the fact that Botswana, the country with thebest record of economic growth in Africa, indeed with one of the finestrecords of economic growth in the whole world, has been an oasis ofdemocracy on that continent over the decades. We need more systematicempirical studies to sort out the claims and counterclaims.

　　There is, in fact, no convincing general evidence that authoritarian[End Page 6] governance and the suppression of political and civilrights are really beneficial to economic development. Indeed, thegeneral statistical picture does not permit any such induction.Systematic empirical studies (for example, by Robert Barro or by AdamPrzeworski) give no real support to the claim that there is a generalconflict between political rights and economic performance.2 Thedirectional linkage seems to depend on many other circumstances, andwhile some statistical investigations note a weakly negative relation,others find a strongly positive one. If all the comparative studies areviewed together, the hypothesis that there is no clear relation betweeneconomic growth and democracy in either direction remains extremelyplausible. Since democracy and political liberty have importance inthemselves, the case for them therefore remains untarnished.3

　　The question also involves a fundamental issue of methods ofeconomic research. We must not only look at statistical connections,but also examine and scrutinize the causal processes that are involvedin economic growth and development. The economic policies andcircumstances that led to the economic success of countries in EastAsia are by now reasonably well understood. While different empiricalstudies have varied in emphasis, there is by now broad consensus on alist of "helpful policies" that includes openness to competition, theuse of international markets, public provision of incentives forinvestment and export, a high level of literacy and schooling,successful land reforms, and other social opportunities that widenparticipation in the process of economic expansion. There is no reasonat all to assume that any of these policies is inconsistent withgreater democracy and had to be forcibly sustained by the elements ofauthoritarianism that happened to be present in South Korea orSingapore or China. Indeed, there is overwhelming evidence to show thatwhat is needed for generating faster economic growth is a friendliereconomic climate rather than a harsher political system.

　　To complete this examination, we must go beyond the narrow confinesof economic growth and scrutinize the broader demands of economicdevelopment, including the need for economic and social security. Inthat context, we have to look at the connection between political andcivil rights, on the one hand, and the prevention of major economicdisasters, on the other. Political and civil rights give people theopportunity to draw attention forcefully to general needs and to demandappropriate public action. The response of a government to the acutesuffering of its people often depends on the pressure that is put onit. The exercise of political rights (such as voting, criticizing,protesting, and the like) can make a real difference to the politicalincentives that operate on a government.

　　I have discussed elsewhere the remarkable fact that, in the terriblehistory of famines in the world, no substantial famine has everoccurred [End Page 7] in any independent and democratic country with arelatively free press.4 We cannot find exceptions to this rule, nomatter where we look: the recent famines of Ethiopia, Somalia, or otherdictatorial regimes; famines in the Soviet Union in the 1930s; China"s1958-61 famine with the failure of the Great Leap Forward; or earlierstill, the famines in Ireland or India under alien rule. China,although it was in many ways doing much better economically than India,still managed (unlike India) to have a famine, indeed the largestrecorded famine in world history: Nearly 30 million people died in thefamine of 1958-61, while faulty governmental policies remaineduncorrected for three full years. The policies went uncriticizedbecause there were no opposition parties in parliament, no free press,and no multiparty elections. Indeed, it is precisely this lack ofchallenge that allowed the deeply defective policies to continue eventhough they were killing millions each year. The same can be said aboutthe world"s two contemporary famines, occurring right now in NorthKorea and Sudan.

　　Famines are often associated with what look like natural disasters,and commentators often settle for the simplicity of explaining faminesby pointing to these events: the floods in China during the failedGreat Leap Forward,(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　 the droughts in Ethiopia, or crop failures in NorthKorea. Nevertheless, many countries with similar natural problems, oreven worse ones, manage perfectly well, because a responsive governmentintervenes to help alleviate hunger. Since the primary victims of afamine are the indigent, deaths can be prevented by recreating incomes(for example, through employment programs), which makes food accessibleto potential famine victims. Even the poorest democratic countries thathave faced terrible droughts or floods or other natural disasters (suchas India in 1973, or Zimbabwe and Botswana in the early 1980s) havebeen able to feed their people without experiencing a famine.

　　Famines are easy to prevent if there is a serious effort to do so,and a democratic government, facing elections and criticisms fromopposition parties and independent newspapers, cannot help but makesuch an effort. Not surprisingly, while India continued to have faminesunder British rule right up to independence (the last famine, which Iwitnessed as a child, was in 1943, four years before independence),they disappeared suddenly with the establishment of a multipartydemocracy and a free press.

　　I have discussed these issues elsewhere, particularly in my jointwork with Jean Dr"eze, so I will not dwell further on them here.5Indeed, the issue of famine is only one example of the reach ofdemocracy, though it is, in many ways, the easiest case to analyze. Thepositive role of political and civil rights applies to the preventionof economic and social disasters in general. When things go fine andeverything is routinely good, this instrumental role of democracy maynot be particularly missed. It is when things get fouled up, for one[End Page 8] reason or another, that the political incentives providedby democratic governance acquire great practical value.

　　There is, I believe, an important lesson here. Many economictechnocrats recommend the use of economic incentives (which the marketsystem provides) while ignoring political incentives (which democraticsystems could guarantee). This is to opt for a deeply unbalanced set ofground rules. The protective power of democracy may not be missed muchwhen a country is lucky enough to be facing no serious calamity, wheneverything is going quite smoothly. Yet the danger of insecurity,arising from changed economic or other circumstances, or fromuncorrected mistakes of policy, can lurk behind what looks like ahealthy state.

　　The recent problems of East and Southeast Asia bring out, amongother things, the penalties of undemocratic governance. This is so intwo striking respects. First, the development of the financial crisisin some of these economies (including South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia)has been closely linked to the lack of transparency in business, inparticular the lack of public participation in reviewing financialarrangements. The absence of an effective democratic forum has beencentral to this failing. Second, once the financial crisis led to ageneral economic recession, the protective power of democracy--notunlike that which prevents famines in democratic countries--was badlymissed in a country like Indonesia. The newly dispossessed did not havethe hearing they needed.

　　A fall in total gross national product of, say, 10 percent may notlook like much if it follows in the wake of a growth rate of 5 or 10percent every year over the past few decades, and yet that decline candecimate lives and create misery for millions if the burden ofcontraction is not widely shared but allowed to be heaped on those--theunemployed or the economically redundant--who can least bear it. Thevulnerable in Indonesia may not have missed democracy when things wentup and up, but that lacuna kept their voice low and muffled as theunequally shared crisis developed. The protective role of democracy isstrongly missed when it is most needed.

　　The Functions of Democracy

　　I have so far allowed the agenda ofthis essay to be determined by the critics of democracy, especially theeconomic critics. I shall return to criticisms again, taking up thearguments of the cultural critics in particular, but the time has comefor me to pursue further the positive analysis of what democracy doesand what may lie at the base of its claim to be a universal value.

　　What exactly is democracy? We must not identify democracy withmajority rule. Democracy has complex demands, which certainly [End Page9] include voting and respect for election results, but it alsorequires the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legalentitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensoreddistribution of news and fair comment. Even elections can be deeplydefective if they occur without the different sides getting an adequateopportunity to present their respective cases, or without theelectorate enjoying the freedom to obtain news and to consider theviews of the competing protagonists. Democracy is a demanding system,and not just a mechanical condition (like majority rule) taken inisolation.(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　Viewed in this light, the merits of democracy and its claim as auniversal value can be related to certain distinct virtues that go withits unfettered practice. Indeed, we can distinguish three differentways in which democracy enriches the lives of the citizens. First,political freedom is a part of human freedom in general, and exercisingcivil and political rights is a crucial part of good lives ofindividuals as social beings. Political and social participation hasintrinsic value for human life and well-being. To be prevented fromparticipation in the political life of the community is a majordeprivation.

　　Second, as I have just discussed (in disputing the claim thatdemocracy is in tension with economic development), democracy has animportant instrumental value in enhancing the hearing that people getin expressing and supporting their claims to political attention(including claims of economic needs). Third--and this is a point to beexplored further--the practice of democracy gives citizens anopportunity to learn from one another, and helps society to form itsvalues and priorities. Even the idea of "needs," including theunderstanding of "economic needs," requires public discussion andexchange of information, views, and analyses. In this sense, democracyhas constructive importance, in addition to its intrinsic value for thelives of the citizens and its instrumental importance in politicaldecisions. The claims of democracy as a universal value have to takenote of this diversity of considerations.

　　The conceptualization--even comprehension--of what are to count as"needs," including "economic needs," may itself require the exercise ofpolitical and civil rights. A proper understanding of what economicneeds are--their content and their force--may require discussion andexchange. Political and civil rights, especially those related to theguaranteeing of open discussion, debate, criticism, and dissent, arecentral to the process of generating informed and considered choices.These processes are crucial to the formation of values and priorities,and we cannot, in general, take preferences as given independently ofpublic discussion, that is, irrespective of whether open interchangeand debate are permitted or not.

　　In fact, the reach and effectiveness of open dialogue are oftenunderestimated in assessing social and political problems. For example,[End Page 10] public discussion has an important role to play inreducing the high rates of fertility that characterize many developingcountries. There is substantial evidence that the sharp decline infertility rates in India"s more literate states has been muchinfluenced by public discussion of the bad effects of high fertilityrates on the community at large, and especially on the lives of youngwomen. If the view has emerged in, say, the Indian state of Kerala orof Tamil Nadu that a happy family in the modern age is a small family,much discussion and debate have gone into the formation of theseperspectives. Kerala now has a fertility rate of 1.7 (similar to thatof Britain and France, and well below China"s 1.9), and this has beenachieved with no coercion, but mainly through the emergence of newvalues--a process in which political and social dialogue has played amajor part. Kerala"s high literacy rate (it ranks higher in literacythan any province in China), especially among women, has greatlycontributed to making such social and political dialogue possible.

　　Miseries and deprivations can be of various kinds, some moreamenable to social remedies than others. The totality of the humanpredicament would be a gross basis for identifying our "needs." Forexample, there are many things that we might have good reason to valueand thus could be taken as "needs" if they were feasible. We could evenwant immortality, as Maitreyee, that remarkable inquiring mind in theUpanishads, famously did in her 3000-year old conversation withYajnvalkya. But we do not see immortality as a "need" because it isclearly unfeasible. Our conception of needs relates to our ideas of thepreventable nature of some deprivations and to our understanding ofwhat can be done about them. In the formation of understandings andbeliefs about feasibility (particularly, social feasibility), publicdiscussions play a crucial role. Political rights, including freedom ofexpression and discussion, are not only pivotal in inducing socialresponses to economic needs, they are also central to theconceptualization of economic needs themselves.

　　Universality of Values

　　If the above analysis is correct, thendemocracy"s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particularmerit. There is a plurality of virtues here, including, first, theintrinsic importance of political participation and freedom in humanlife; second, the instrumental importance of political incentives inkeeping governments responsible and accountable; and third, theconstructive role of democracy in the formation of values and in theunderstanding of needs, rights, and duties.(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　 In the light of thisdiagnosis, we may now address the motivating question of this essay,namely the case for seeing democracy as a universal value. [End Page11]

　　In disputing this claim, it is sometimes argued that not everyoneagrees on the decisive importance of democracy, particularly when itcompetes with other desirable things for our attention and loyalty.This is indeed so, and there is no unanimity here. This lack ofunanimity is seen by some as sufficient evidence that democracy is nota universal value.

　　Clearly, we must begin by dealing with a methodological question:What is a universal value? For a value to be considered universal, mustit have the consent of everyone? If that were indeed necessary, thenthe category of universal values might well be empty. I know of novalue--not even motherhood (I think of Mommie Dearest)--to which no onehas ever objected. I would argue that universal consent is not requiredfor something to be a universal value. Rather, the claim of a universalvalue is that people anywhere may have reason to see it as valuable.

　　When Mahatma Gandhi argued for the universal value of non-violence,he was not arguing that people everywhere already acted according tothis value, but rather that they had good reason to see it as valuable.Similarly, when Rabindranath Tagore argued for "the freedom of themind" as a universal value, he was not saying that this claim isaccepted by all, but that all do have reason enough to accept it--areason that he did much to explore, present, and propagate.6 Understoodin this way, any claim that something is a universal value involvessome counterfactual analysis--in particular, whether people might seesome value in a claim that they have not yet considered adequately. Allclaims to universal value--not just that of democracy--have thisimplicit presumption.

　　I would argue that it is with regard to this often implicitpresumption that the biggest attitudinal shift toward democracy hasoccurred in the twentieth century. In considering democracy for acountry that does not have it and where many people may not yet havehad the opportunity to consider it for actual practice, it is nowpresumed that the people involved would approve of it once it becomes areality in their lives. In the nineteenth century this assumptiontypically would have not been made, but the presumption that is takento be natural (what I earlier called the "default" position) haschanged radically during the twentieth century.

　　It must also be noted that this change is, to a great extent, basedon observing the history of the twentieth century. As democracy hasspread, its adherents have grown, not shrunk. Starting off from Europeand America, democracy as a system has reached very many distantshores, where it has been met with willing participation andacceptance. Moreover, when an existing democracy has been overthrown,there have been widespread protests, even though these protests haveoften been brutally suppressed. Many people have been willing to risktheir lives in the fight to bring back democracy. [End Page 12]

　　Some who dispute the status of democracy as a universal value basetheir argument not on the absence of unanimity, but on the presence ofregional contrasts. These alleged contrasts are sometimes related tothe poverty of some nations. According to this argument, poor peopleare interested, and have reason to be interested, in bread, not indemocracy. This oft-repeated argument is fallacious at two differentlevels.

　　First, as discussed above, the protective role of democracy may beparticularly important for the poor. This obviously applies topotential famine victims who face starvation. It also applies to thedestitute thrown off the economic ladder in a financial crisis. Peoplein economic need also need a political voice. Democracy is not a luxurythat can await the arrival of general prosperity.

　　Second, there is very little evidence that poor people, given thechoice, prefer to reject democracy. It is thus of some interest to notethat when an erstwhile Indian government in the mid-1970s tried out asimilar argument to justify the alleged "emergency" (and thesuppression of various political and civil rights) that it haddeclared, an election was called that divided the voters precisely onthis issue. In that fateful election, fought largely on this oneoverriding theme, the suppression of basic political and civil rightswas firmly rejected, and the Indian electorate--one of the poorest inthe world--showed itself to be no less keen on protesting against thedenial of basic liberties and rights than on complaining about economicdeprivation.

　　To the extent that there has been any testing of the propositionthat the poor do not care about civil and political rights, theevidence is entirely against that claim. Similar points can be made byobserving the struggle for democratic freedoms in South Korea,Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, and elsewhere inAsia. Similarly, while political freedom is widely denied in Africa,(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　there have been movements and protests against such repression whenevercircumstances have permitted them.

　　The Argument from Cultural Differences

　　There is also anotherargument in defense of an allegedly fundamental regional contrast, onerelated not to economic circumstances but to cultural differences.Perhaps the most famous of these claims relates to what have beencalled "Asian values." It has been claimed that Asians traditionallyvalue discipline, not political freedom, and thus the attitude todemocracy must inevitably be much more skeptical in these countries. Ihave discussed this thesis in some detail in my Morganthau MemorialLecture at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.7

　　It is very hard to find any real basis for this intellectual claimin the history of Asian cultures, especially if we look at theclassical [End Page 13] traditions of India, the Middle East, Iran, andother parts of Asia. For example, one of the earliest and most emphaticstatements advocating the tolerance of pluralism and the duty of thestate to protect minorities can be found in the inscriptions of theIndian emperor Ashoka in the third century B.C.

　　Asia is, of course, a very large area, containing 60 percent of theworld"s population, and generalizations about such a vast set ofpeoples is not easy. Sometimes the advocates of "Asian values" havetended to look primarily at East Asia as the region of particularapplicability. The general thesis of a contrast between the West andAsia often concentrates on the lands to the east of Thailand, eventhough there is also a more ambitious claim that the rest of Asia israther "similar." Lee Kuan Yew, to whom we must be grateful for beingsuch a clear expositor (and for articulating fully what is often statedvaguely in this tangled literature), outlines "the fundamentaldifference between Western concepts of society and government and EastAsian concepts" by explaining, "when I say East Asians, I mean Korea,Japan, China, Vietnam, as distinct from Southeast Asia, which is a mixbetween the Sinic and the Indian, though Indian culture itselfemphasizes similar values."8

　　Even East Asia itself, however, is remarkably diverse, with manyvariations to be found not only among Japan, China, Korea, and othercountries of the region, but also within each country. Confucius is thestandard author quoted in interpreting Asian values, but he is not theonly intellectual influence in these countries (in Japan, China, andKorea for example, there are very old and very widespread Buddhisttraditions, powerful for over a millennium and a half, and there arealso other influences, including a considerable Christian presence).There is no homogeneous worship of order over freedom in any of thesecultures.

　　Furthermore, Confucius himself did not recommend blind allegiance tothe state. When Zilu asks him "how to serve a prince," Confuciusreplies (in a statement that the censors of authoritarian regimes maywant to ponder), "Tell him the truth even if it offends him."9Confucius is not averse to practical caution and tact, but does notforgo the recommendation to oppose a bad government (tactfully, ifnecessary): "When the [good] way prevails in the state, speak boldlyand act boldly. When the state has lost the way, act boldly and speaksoftly."10

　　Indeed, Confucius provides a clear pointer to the fact that the twopillars of the imagined edifice of Asian values, loyalty to family andobedience to the state, can be in severe conflict with each other. Manyadvocates of the power of "Asian values" see the role of the state asan extension of the role of the family, but as Confucius noted, therecan be tension between the two. The Governor of She told Confucius,[End Page 14] "Among my people, there is a man of unbending integrity:when his father stole a sheep, he denounced him." To this Confuciusreplied, "Among my people, men of integrity do things differently: afather covers up for his son, a son covers up for his father--and thereis integrity in what they do."11

　　The monolithic interpretation of Asian values as hostile todemocracy and political rights does not bear critical scrutiny. Ishould not, I suppose, be too critical of the lack of scholarshipsupporting these beliefs, since those who have made these claims arenot scholars but political leaders, often official or unofficialspokesmen for authoritarian governments. It is, however, interesting tosee that while we academics can be impractical about practicalpolitics, practical politicians can, in turn, be rather impracticalabout scholarship.

　　It is not hard, of course, to find authoritarian writings within theAsian traditions. But neither is it hard to find them in Westernclassics: One has only to reflect on the writings of Plato or Aquinasto see that devotion to discipline is not a special Asian taste. Todismiss the plausibility of democracy as a universal value because ofthe presence of some Asian writings on discipline and order would besimilar to rejecting the plausibility of democracy as a natural form ofgovernment in Europe or America today on the basis of the writings ofPlato or Aquinas (not to mention the substantial medieval literature insupport of the Inquisitions).(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　Due to the experience of contemporary political battles, especiallyin the Middle East, Islam is often portrayed as fundamentallyintolerant of and hostile to individual freedom. But the presence ofdiversity and variety within a tradition applies very much to Islam aswell. In India, Akbar and most of the other Moghul emperors (with thenotable exception of Aurangzeb) provide good examples of both thetheory and practice of political and religious tolerance. The Turkishemperors were often more tolerant than their European contemporaries.Abundant examples can also be found among rulers in Cairo and Baghdad.Indeed, in the twelfth century, the great Jewish scholar Maimonides hadto run away from an intolerant Europe (where he was born), and from itspersecution of Jews, to the security of a tolerant and urbane Cairo andthe patronage of Sultan Saladin.

　　Diversity is a feature of most cultures in the world. Westerncivilization is no exception. The practice of democracy that has wonout in the modern West is largely a result of a consensus that hasemerged since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, andparticularly in the last century or so. To read in this a historicalcommitment of the West--over the millennia--to democracy, and then tocontrast it with non-Western traditions (treating each as monolithic)would be a great mistake. This tendency toward oversimplification canbe seen not only in the writings of some governmental spokesmen [EndPage 15] in Asia, but also in the theories of some of the finestWestern scholars themselves.

　　As an example from the writings of a major scholar whose works, inmany other ways, have been totally impressive, let me cite SamuelHuntington"s thesis on the clash of civilizations, where theheterogeneities within each culture get quite inadequate recognition.His study comes to the clear conclusion that "a sense of individualismand a tradition of rights and liberties" can be found in the West thatare "unique among civilized societies."12 Huntington also argues that"the central characteristics of the West, those which distinguish itfrom other civilizations, antedate the modernization of the West." Inhis view, "The West was West long before it was modern."13 It is thisthesis that--I have argued--does not survive historical scrutiny.

　　For every attempt by an Asian government spokesman to contrastalleged "Asian values" with alleged Western ones, there is, it seems,an attempt by a Western intellectual to make a similar contrast fromthe other side. But even though every Asian pull may be matched by aWestern push, the two together do not really manage to dent democracy"sclaim to be a universal value.

　　Where the Debate Belongs

　　I have tried to cover a number ofissues related to the claim that democracy is a universal value. Thevalue of democracy includes its intrinsic importance in human life, itsinstrumental role in generating political incentives, and itsconstructive function in the formation of values (and in understandingthe force and feasibility of claims of needs, rights, and duties).These merits are not regional in character. Nor is the advocacy ofdiscipline or order. Heterogeneity of values seems to characterizemost, perhaps all, major cultures. The cultural argument does notforeclose, nor indeed deeply constrain, the choices we can make today.

　　Those choices have to be made here and now, taking note of thefunctional roles of democracy, on which the case for democracy in thecontemporary world depends. I have argued that this case is indeedstrong and not regionally contingent. The force of the claim thatdemocracy is a universal value lies, ultimately, in that strength. Thatis where the debate belongs. It cannot be disposed of by imaginedcultural taboos or assumed civilizational predispositions imposed byour various pasts.

　　Amartya Sen, winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics, is Masterof Trinity College, Cambridge, and Lamont University Professor Emeritusat Harvard University. The following essay is based on a keynoteaddress that he delivered at a February 1999 conference in New Delhi on"Building a Worldwide Movement for Democracy," cosponsored by theNational Endowment for Democracy, the Confederation of Indian Industry,and the Centre for Policy Research (New Delhi). This essay draws onwork more fully presented in his book Development as Freedom, to bepublished by Alfred Knopf later this year.

　　Notes

　　1. In Aldous Huxley"s novel Point Counter Point, this wasenough to give an adequate excuse to a cheating husband, who tells hiswife that he must go to London to study democracy in ancient India inthe library of the British Museum, while in reality he goes to see hismistress.

　　2. Adam Przeworski et al., Sustainable Democracy (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1995); Robert J. Barro, Getting It Right:Markets and Choices in a Free Society (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1996).

　　3. I have examined the empirical evidence and causal connections insome detail in my book Development as Freedom,(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　 forthcoming from Knopfin 1999.

　　4. See my "Development: Which Way Now?" Economic Journal 93(December 1983); Resources, Values, and Development (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1984); and my "Rationality and SocialChoice," presidential address to the American Economic Association,published in American Economic Review in March 1995. See also JeanDr"eze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1987); Frances D"Souza, ed., Starving in Silence: A Report onFamine and Censorship (London: Article 19 International Centre onCensorship, 1990); Human Rights Watch, Indivisible Human Rights: TheRelationship between Political and Civil Rights to Survival,Subsistence and Poverty (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992); andInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, WorldDisaster Report 1994 (Geneva: Red Cross, 1994).

　　5. Dr"eze and Sen, Hunger and Public Action.

　　6. See my "Tagore and His India," New York Review of Books, 26 June 1997.

　　7. Amartya Sen, "Human Rights and Asian Values," Morgenthau MemorialLecture (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and InternationalAffairs, 1997), published in a shortened form in The New Republic,14-21 July 1997.

　　8. Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," Foreign Affairs 73 (March-April 1994): 113.

　　9. The Analects of Confucius, Simon Leys, trans. (New York: Norton, 1997), 14.22, 70.

　　10. The Analects of Confucius, 14.3, 66.

　　11. The Analects of Confucius, 13.18, 63.

　　12. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 71.

　　13. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 69.

　　阿瑪?shù)賮啞ど��?998年諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎獲得者英國劍橋大學(xué)三一學(xué)院院長、哈佛大學(xué)退休教授

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