林肯總統(tǒng)在 1 1861 年的第一次就職演說 -- 英文版

　 First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln

　 MONDAY, MARCH 4, 1861

　 Fellow-Citizens of the United States: In compliance with a custom as old as the Government itself, I appear before you to address you briefly and to take in your presence the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States to be taken by the President before he enters on the execution of this office." I do not consider it necessary at present for me to discuss those matters of administration about which there is no special anxiety or excitement. Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States that by the accession of a Republican Administration their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered.

　There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that-- I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations and had never recanted them; and more than this, they placed in the platform for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read: Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend; and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.

　I now reiterate these sentiments, and in doing so I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the now incoming Administration. I add, too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given will be cheerfully given to all the States when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause--as cheerfully to one section as to another. There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from service or labor. The clause I now read is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions: No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due. It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the intention of the lawgiver is the law.

　All members of Congress swear their support to the whole Constitution--to this provision as much as to any other. To the proposition, then, that slaves whose cases come within the terms of this clause "shall be delivered up" their oaths are unanimous. Now, if they would make the effort in good temper, could they not with nearly equal

　unanimity frame and pass a law by means of which to keep good that unanimous oath? There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be enforced by national or by State authority, but surely that difference is not a very material one. If the slave is to be surrendered, it can be of but little consequence to him or to others by which authority it is done. And should anyone in any case be content that his oath shall go unkept on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to how it shall be kept?

　Again: In any law upon this subject ought not all the safeguards of liberty known in civilized and humane jurisprudence to be introduced, so that a free man be not in any case surrendered as a slave? And might it not be well at the same time to provide by law for the enforcement of that clause in the Constitution which guarantees that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States"? I take the official oath to-day with no mental reservations and with no purpose to construe the Constitution or laws by any hypercritical rules; and while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much safer for all, both in official and private stations, to conform to and abide by all those acts which stand unrepealed than to violate any of them trusting to find impunity in having them held to be unconstitutional. It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a President under our National Constitution. During that period fifteen different and greatly distinguished citizens have in succession administered the executive branch of the Government. They have conducted it through many perils, and generally with great success.

　Yet, with all this scope of precedent, I now enter upon the same task for the brief constitutional term of four years under great and peculiar difficulty. A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted. I hold that in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution the Union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our National Constitution, and the Union will endure forever, it being impossible to destroy it except by some action not provided for in the instrument itself. Again: If the United States be not a government proper, but an association of States in the nature of contract merely, can it, as acontract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a contract may violate it--break it, so to speak--but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it? Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution.

　It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen States expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was "to form a more perfect Union." But if destruction of the Union by one or by a part only of the States be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity. It follows from these views that no State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that

　effect are legally void, and that acts of violence within any State or States against the authority of the United States are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances. I therefore consider that in view of the Constitution and the laws the Union is unbroken, and to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part, and Ishall perform it so far as practicable unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisite means or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary. I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself. In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere. Where hostility to the United States in any interior locality shall be so great and universal as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object. While the strict legal right may exist in the Government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating and so nearly impracticable withal that I deem it better to forego for the time the uses of such offices. The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union. So far as possible the people everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection. The course here indicated will be followed unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper, and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised, according to circumstances actually existing and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections. That there are persons in one section or another who seek to destroy the Union at all events and are glad of any pretext to do it I will neither affirm nor deny; but if there be such, I need address no word to them. To those, however, who really love the Union may I not speak? Before entering upon so grave a matter as the destruction of our national fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes, would it not be wise to ascertain precisely why we do it? Will you hazard so desperate a step while there is any possibility that any portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence? Will you, while the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones you fly from, will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake? All profess to be content in the Union if all constitutional rights can be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right plainly written in the Constitution has been denied? I think not. Happily, the human mind is so constituted that no party can reach to the audacity of doing this. Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a plainly written provision of the Constitution has ever been denied. If by the mere force of numbers a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly written constitutional right, it might in a moral point of view justify revolution; certainly would if such right were a vital one. But such is not our case. All the vital rights of minorities and of individuals are so plainly assured to them by affirmations and negations, guaranties and prohibitions, in the Constitution that controversies never arise concerning them. But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every question which may occur in practical administration. No foresight can anticipate nor any document of reasonable length contain express provisions for all possible questions. Shall fugitives from labor be surrendered by national or by State authority?

　The Constitution does not expressly say. May Congress prohibit slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. Must Congress protect slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. From questions of this class spring all our constitutional controversies, and we divide upon them into majorities and minorities. If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the Government must cease. There is no other alternative, for continuing the Government is acquiescence on one side or the other. If a minority in such case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make a precedent which in turn will divide and ruin them, for a minority of their own will secede from them whenever a majority refuses to be controlled by such minority. For instance, why may not any portion of a new confederacy a year or two hence arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it? All who cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper of doing this. Is there such perfect identity of interests among the States to compose a new union as to produce harmony only and prevent renewed secession? Plainly the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it does of necessity fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible. The rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left. I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government. And while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice. At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court or the judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink to decide cases properly brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes. One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute. The fugitive- slave clause of the Constitution and the law for the suppression of the foreign slave trade are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law can ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I think, can not be perfectly cured, and it would be worse in both cases after the separation of the sections than before. The foreign slave trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived without restriction in one section, while fugitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other. Physically speaking, we can not separate. We can not remove our respective sections from each other nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other, but the different parts of our

　country can not do this. They can not but remain face to face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you can not fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions, as to terms of intercourse, are again upon you. This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it. I can not be ignorant of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of having the National Constitution amended. While I make no recommendation of amendments, I fully recognize the rightful authority of the people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the instrument itself; and I should, under existing circumstances, favor rather than oppose a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it. I will venture to add that to me the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments to originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take or reject propositions originated by others, not especially chosen for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such as they would wish to either accept or refuse. I understand a proposed amendment to the Constitution--which amendment, however, I have not seen--has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable. The Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they have referred none upon him to fix terms for the separation of the States. The people themselves can do this if also they choose, but the Executive as such has nothing to do with it. His duty is to administer the present Government as it came to his hands and to transmit it unimpaired by him to his successor. Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our present differences, is either party without faith of being in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with His eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal of the American people. By the frame of the Government under which we live this same people have wisely given their public servants but little power for mischief, and have with equal wisdom provided for the return of that little to their own hands at very short intervals. While the people retain their virtue and vigilance no Administration by any extreme of wickedness or folly can very seriously injure the Government in the short space of four years. My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and well upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. If there be an object to hurry any of you in hot haste to a step which you would never take deliberately, that object will be frustrated by taking time; but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are now dissatisfied still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and, on the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the new Administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the right side in the dispute, there still is no single good reason for precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this

　favored land are still competent to adjust in the best way all our present difficulty. In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I shall have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect, and defend it." I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature. 林肯 總統(tǒng)第一次 就職演說1 (1861 年 年 3 3 月 月 4 4 日) )

　林肯

　[學(xué)術(shù)交流網(wǎng)按：林肯是美國人民和政治家推崇的偉大人物之一，他的維護(hù)國家同意，反對分裂的主張，反對擴(kuò)張奴隸制的主張尤其受到廣泛贊揚(yáng)。自 2005 年 3 月 1 日起發(fā)布林肯總統(tǒng)有關(guān)維護(hù)國家統(tǒng)一、反對分裂的演說、信件、咨文的內(nèi)容。]

　合眾國的同胞們：

　1861 年 3 月 4 日

　按照一個(gè)和我們的政府一樣古老的習(xí)慣，我現(xiàn)在來到諸位的面前，簡單地講幾句話，并在你們的面前，遵照合眾國憲法規(guī)定一個(gè)總統(tǒng)在他“到職視事之前”必須宣誓的儀式，在大家面前宣誓。

　我認(rèn)為沒有必要在這里來討論并不特別令人憂慮和不安的行政方面的問題。

　在南方各州人民中似乎存在著一種恐懼心理。他們認(rèn)為，隨著共和黨政府的執(zhí)政，他們的財(cái)產(chǎn)，他們的和平生活和人身安全都將遭到危險(xiǎn)。這種恐懼是從來沒有任何事實(shí)根據(jù)的。說實(shí)在的，大量相反的證據(jù)倒是一直存在，并隨時(shí)可以供他們檢查的。那種證據(jù)幾乎在現(xiàn)在對你們講話的這個(gè)人公開發(fā)表的每一篇演說中都能找到。這里我只想引用其中的一篇，在那篇演說中我曾說，“我完全無意，對已經(jīng)存在奴隸制的各州的這一制度，進(jìn)行直接或間接的干涉。我深信我根本沒有合法權(quán)利那樣做，而且我無此意圖。”那些提名我并選舉我的人都完全知道，我曾明確這么講過，并且還講過許多類似的話，而且從來也沒有收回過我已講過的這些話。不僅如此，他們還在綱領(lǐng)中，寫進(jìn)了對他們和對我來說，都具有法律效力的一項(xiàng)清楚明白、不容含糊的決議讓我接受。這里我來對大家談?wù)勥@一決議：

　“決議，保持各州的各種權(quán)利不受侵犯，特別是各州完全憑自己的決斷來安排和控制本州內(nèi)部各種制度的權(quán)利不受侵犯，乃是我們的政治結(jié)構(gòu)賴以完善和得以持久的權(quán)力均衡的至為重要的因素；我們譴責(zé)使用武裝力量非法入侵任何一個(gè)州或準(zhǔn)州的土地，這種入侵不論使用什么借口，都是最嚴(yán)重的罪行。”

　我現(xiàn)在重申這些觀點(diǎn)：而在這樣做的時(shí)候，我只想提請公眾注意，最能對這一點(diǎn)提出確切證據(jù)的那就是全國任何一個(gè)地方的財(cái)產(chǎn)、和平生活和人身安全決不會在任何情況下，由于即將上任的政府而遭到危險(xiǎn)。這里我還要補(bǔ)充說，各州只要符合憲法和法律規(guī)定，合法地提出保護(hù)要求，政府便一定會樂于給予保護(hù),不管是出于什么原因一一而且對任何一個(gè)地方都一視同仁。

　有一個(gè)爭論得很多的問題是，關(guān)于逃避服務(wù)或引渡從勞役中逃走的人的問題。我現(xiàn)在要宣讀的條文，也和任何有關(guān)其它問題的條款一樣，明明白白寫在憲法之中：

　“凡根據(jù)一個(gè)州的法律應(yīng)在該州于服務(wù)或從事勞役的人，如逃到另一州，一律不得按照這一州的法律或條例，使其解除該項(xiàng)服務(wù)或勞役，而必，須按照有權(quán)享有該項(xiàng)服務(wù)或勞役當(dāng)事人的要求，將其引渡。”

　毫無疑問，按照制訂這一條款的人的意圖，此項(xiàng)規(guī)定實(shí)際指的就是，對我們所說的逃亡奴隸有權(quán)索回；而法律制訂人的這一意圖實(shí)際已成為法律。國會的所有議員都曾宣誓遵守憲法中的一切條款——對這一條和其它各條并無兩樣。因此，關(guān)于適合這一條款規(guī)定的奴隸應(yīng)“將其引渡”這一點(diǎn)，他們的誓言是完全一致的。那么現(xiàn)在如果他們心平氣和地作一番努力，他們難道不能以幾乎同樣完全一致的誓言，制訂一項(xiàng)法律，以使他們的共同誓言得以實(shí)施嗎?

　究竟這一條款應(yīng)該由國家當(dāng)局，還是由州當(dāng)局來執(zhí)行，大家的意見還不完全一致；但可以肯定地說，這種分歧并不是什么十分重要的問題。只要奴隸能被交還，那究竟由哪一個(gè)當(dāng)局來交還，對奴隸或?qū)�別的人來說，沒有什么關(guān)系。任何人，在任何情況下，也決不會因?yàn)閼?yīng)以何種方式來實(shí)�，F(xiàn)他的誓言這樣一個(gè)無關(guān)緊要的爭執(zhí)，他便會認(rèn)為完全可以不遵守自己的誓言吧?

　另外，在任何有關(guān)這一問題的法律中，應(yīng)不應(yīng)該把文明和人道法學(xué)中關(guān)于自由的各項(xiàng)保證都寫上，以防止在任何情況下使一個(gè)自由人被作為奴隸交出嗎?同時(shí)，憲法中還有一條規(guī)定，明確保證“每一州的公民都享有其它各州公民所享有公民的一切特權(quán)和豁免權(quán)”，我們用法律保證使這一條文得以執(zhí)行，那不是更好嗎?

　我今天在這里正式宣誓，思想上決無任何保留，也決無意以任何過于挑剔的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來解釋憲法或法律條文。我現(xiàn)在雖不打算詳細(xì)指出國會的哪些法令必須要遵照執(zhí)行；但我建議，我們大家，不論以個(gè)人身份還是以公職人員的身份，為了有更多的安全，我們最好服從并遵守現(xiàn)在還沒有廢除的一切法令，而不要輕易相信可以指之為不合憲法，便可以逃脫罪責(zé)，而對它們公然違反。

　自從第一任總統(tǒng)根據(jù)國家憲法宣誓就職以來，七十二年已經(jīng)過去了。在這期間，十五位十分杰出的公民相繼主持過政府的行政部門。他們引導(dǎo)著它度過了許多艱難險(xiǎn)阻；一般都獲得極大的成功。然而，盡管有這么多可供參考的先例，我現(xiàn)在將在憲法所規(guī)定的短短四年任期中來擔(dān)任這同一任務(wù)，卻．面臨著巨大的非同一般的困難。在此以前，分裂聯(lián)邦只是受到了威脅，而現(xiàn)在卻是已出現(xiàn)力圖分裂它的可怕行動了。

　從一般法律和我們的憲法來仔細(xì)考慮，我堅(jiān)信，我們各州組成的聯(lián)邦是永久性的。在一切國民政府的根本大法中永久性這一點(diǎn)，雖不一定寫明，卻是不言而喻的。我們完全可以肯定說，沒有一個(gè)名副其實(shí)的政府會在自己的根本法中定出一條，規(guī)定自己完結(jié)的期限。繼續(xù)執(zhí)行我國憲法所明文規(guī)定的各項(xiàng)條文，聯(lián)邦便將永遠(yuǎn)存在下去——除了采取并未見之于憲法的行動，誰也不可能毀滅掉聯(lián)邦。

　還有，就算合眾國并不是個(gè)名副其實(shí)的政府，而只是依靠契約成立的一個(gè)各州的聯(lián)合體，那既有契約的約束，若非參加這一契約的各方一致同意，我們能說取消就把它取消嗎?參加訂立契約的一方可以違約，或者說毀約；但如果合法地取消這一契約，豈能不需要大家一致同意嗎?

　從這些總原則出發(fā)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，從法學(xué)觀點(diǎn)來看，聯(lián)邦具有永久性質(zhì)的提法，是為聯(lián)邦自身的歷史所證實(shí)的。聯(lián)邦本身比憲法更為早得多。事實(shí)上，它是由 1774 年，簽訂的《聯(lián)合條款》建立的。到 1776 年的《獨(dú)立宣言》才使它進(jìn)一步成熟和延續(xù)下來。然后，通過 1778

　年的“邦聯(lián)條款”使它更臻成熟，當(dāng)時(shí)參加的十三個(gè)州便已明確保證要使邦聯(lián)永久存在下去。最后，到 1787 年制訂的憲法公開宣布的目的之一，便是“組建一個(gè)更為完美的聯(lián)邦”。

　但是，如果任何一個(gè)州，或幾個(gè)州也可以合法地把聯(lián)邦給取消掉，加這個(gè)聯(lián)邦可是比它在憲法制訂以前還更不完美了，因?yàn)樗�已失去了它的一個(gè)至關(guān)重要因素——永久性。

　從這些觀點(diǎn)我們可以認(rèn)定，任何一個(gè)州，都不可能僅憑自己動議，便能合法地退出聯(lián)邦——而任何以此為目的的決議和法令在法律上都是無效的；至于任何一州或幾州的反對合眾國當(dāng)

　局的暴力行為，都可以依據(jù)具體情況視為叛亂或革命行為。

　因此我認(rèn)為,從憲法和法律的角度來看，聯(lián)邦是不容分裂的；我也將竭盡全力，按照憲法明確賦于我的責(zé)任，堅(jiān)決負(fù)責(zé)讓聯(lián)邦的一切法令在所有各州得以貫徹執(zhí)行。這樣做，我認(rèn)為只是履行我應(yīng)負(fù)的簡單職責(zé)；只要是可行的，我就一定要履行它，除非我的合法的主人美國人民，收回賦予我的不可缺少的工具，或行使他們的權(quán)威，命令我采取相反的行動。我相信我這話決不會被看成是一種恫嚇，而只會被看作實(shí)現(xiàn)聯(lián)邦已公開宣布的目的，它必將按照憲法保衛(wèi)和維持它自己的存在。

　要做到這一點(diǎn)并不需要流血或使用暴力，除非有人把它強(qiáng)。加于國家當(dāng)局，否則便決不會發(fā)生那種情況。賦予我的權(quán)力將被用來保持、占有和掌管屬于政府的一切財(cái)產(chǎn)和土地。征收各種稅款和關(guān)稅；但除開為了這些目的確有必要這外，決不會有什么入侵問題——決不會在任何地方對人民，或在人民之間使用武力。任何內(nèi)地，即使對聯(lián)邦政府的敵對情緒已十分嚴(yán)重和普遍，以致妨害有能力的當(dāng)?shù)毓�民�?zhí)行聯(lián)邦職務(wù)的時(shí)候，政府也決不會強(qiáng)制派進(jìn)令人厭惡的外來人去擔(dān)任這些職務(wù)。盡管按嚴(yán)格的法律規(guī)定，政府有權(quán)強(qiáng)制履行這些職責(zé)，但一定要那樣做，必然非常使人不愉快，也幾乎不切實(shí)際，所以我認(rèn)為最好還是暫時(shí)先把這些職責(zé)放一放。

　郵政，除非遭到拒收，仍將在聯(lián)邦全境運(yùn)作。在可能的情況下，一定要讓各地人民，都享有完善的安全感，這十分有利于冷靜思索和反思。我在這里所講的這些方針必將奉行，除非當(dāng)前事態(tài)和實(shí)際經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明修改或改變方針是合適的。對任何一個(gè)事件和緊急問題，我一定會根據(jù)當(dāng)時(shí)出現(xiàn)的具體形勢謹(jǐn)慎從事，期望以和平手段解決國內(nèi)糾紛，力圖恢復(fù)兄弟愛手足情。

　至于說某些地方總有些人不顧一切一心想破壞聯(lián)邦，并不惜以任何借口圖謀不軌，我不打算肯定或否定；如果確有這樣一些人，我不必要再對他們講什么。但對那些真正熱愛聯(lián)邦的人,我不可以講幾句嗎?

　在我們著手研究如此嚴(yán)重的一件事情之前，那就是要把我們的國家組織連同它的一切利益，一切記憶和一切希望全給消滅掉，難道明智的做法不是先仔細(xì)研究一下那樣做究竟是為了什么?當(dāng)事實(shí)上極有可能你企圖逃避的禍害并不存在的時(shí)候，你還會不顧一切采取那種貽害無窮的步驟嗎?或者你要逃避的災(zāi)禍雖確實(shí)存在，而在你逃往的地方卻有更大的災(zāi)禍在等著你；那你會往那里逃嗎?你會冒險(xiǎn)犯下如此可怕的一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤嗎?

　大家都說，如果憲法中所規(guī)定的一切權(quán)利都確實(shí)得到執(zhí)行，那他也就會留在聯(lián)邦里。那么，真有什么如憲法申明文規(guī)定的權(quán)利被否定了嗎?我想沒有。很幸運(yùn)，人的頭腦是這樣構(gòu)造出來的，沒有一個(gè)黨敢于如此冒天下之大不韙。如果可能，請你們講出哪怕是一個(gè)例子來，說明有什么憲法中明文規(guī)定的條款是沒有得到執(zhí)行的。如果多數(shù)派完全靠人數(shù)上的優(yōu)勢，剝奪掉少數(shù)派憲法上明文規(guī)定的權(quán)利，這件事從道義的角度來看，也許可以說革命是正當(dāng)?shù)?mdash;—如果被剝奪的是極為重要的權(quán)利，那革命就肯定無疑是合理行動。但我們的情況卻并非

　如此。少數(shù)派和個(gè)人的一切重要權(quán)利，在憲法中，通過肯定和否定、保證和禁令；都一一向他們作了明確保證,以致關(guān)于這類問題，從來也沒有引起過爭論。但是，在制訂基本法時(shí)卻不可能對實(shí)際工作中出現(xiàn)的任何問題，都一一寫下可以立即加以應(yīng)用的條文。再高明的預(yù)見也不可能料定未來的一切，任何長度適當(dāng)?shù)奈募�也不可能包容下針對一切可能發(fā)生的問題的條文。逃避勞役的人到底應(yīng)該由聯(lián)邦政府交還還是由州政府交還呢?憲法上沒有具體規(guī)定。國會可以在準(zhǔn)州禁止奴隸制嗎?憲法沒有具體規(guī)定。國會必須保護(hù)準(zhǔn)州的奴隸制嗎?憲法也沒有具體規(guī)定。

　從這類問題中引出了我們對憲法問題的爭端，并因這類問題使我們分成了多數(shù)派和少數(shù)派。如果少數(shù)派不肯默認(rèn)，多數(shù)派便必須默認(rèn)，否則政府便只好停止工作了。再沒有任何別的路可走；要讓政府繼續(xù)行使職權(quán)，便必須要這一方或那一方默認(rèn)。在這種情況下，如果一個(gè)少數(shù)派寧可脫離也決不默認(rèn)，那他們也就開創(chuàng)將來必會使他們分裂和毀滅的先例；因?yàn)椋��?dāng)多數(shù)派拒絕接受這樣一個(gè)少數(shù)派的控制的時(shí)候，他們中的少數(shù)派便必會從他們之中再脫離出去。比如說，一個(gè)新的聯(lián)盟的任何一部分，在一兩年之后，為什么就不會像現(xiàn)在的聯(lián)邦中的一些部分堅(jiān)決要脫離出去一樣，執(zhí)意要從從那個(gè)新聯(lián)盟中脫離出去。所有懷著分裂聯(lián)邦思想的人現(xiàn)在都正接受著分裂思想的教育。難道要組成一個(gè)新聯(lián)邦的州，它們的利益竟會是那樣完全一致，它們只會有和諧，而不會再出現(xiàn)脫離行動嗎?

　非常清楚，脫離的中心思想實(shí)質(zhì)就是無政府主義。一個(gè)受著憲法的檢查和限制的約束，總是隨著大眾意見和情緒的慎重變化而及時(shí)改變的多數(shù)派，是自由人民的唯一真正的統(tǒng)治者。誰要想排斥他們，便必然走向無政府主義或?qū)Ｖ浦髁x。完全一致是根本不可能的；把少數(shù)派的統(tǒng)治作為一種長期安排是完全不能接受的，所以，一旦排斥了多數(shù)原則，剩下的便只有某種形式的無政府主義或某專制主義了。

　我沒有忘記某些人的說法，認(rèn)為憲法問題應(yīng)該由最高法院來裁決。我也不否認(rèn)這種裁決，在任何情況下，對訴訟各萬，以及訴訟目的，完全具有約束力，而且在類似的情況中，—應(yīng)受到政府的一切其它部門高度的尊重和重視。盡管非常明顯，這類裁決在某一特定案例中都很可能會是錯(cuò)誤的，然而，這樣隨之而來的惡果總只限于該特定案件，同時(shí)裁決還有機(jī)會被駁回，不致成為以后判案的先例，那這種過失比起其它的過失來當(dāng)然更讓人容易忍受。同時(shí)，正直的公民必須承認(rèn)，如果政府在有關(guān)全體人民利害的重大問題的政策，都得由最高法院的裁決，作出決定那一旦對個(gè)人之間的一般訴訟作出裁決時(shí)，人民便已不再是自己的主人，而達(dá)到了將他們的政府交給那個(gè)高于一切的法庭的地步了。我這樣說，決無意對法院或法官表示不滿。一件案子按正常程序送到他們面前，對它作出正當(dāng)裁決，是他們的不可推卸的責(zé)任；如果別的人硬要把他們的判決用來達(dá)到政治目的，那并不是他們的過錯(cuò)。

　我國有一部分人相信奴隸制是正確的。應(yīng)該擴(kuò)展，而另一部分人又相信它是錯(cuò)誤的，不應(yīng)該擴(kuò)展。這是唯一的實(shí)質(zhì)性的爭執(zhí)，憲法中有關(guān)逃亡奴隸的條款，以及制止對外奴隸貿(mào)易的法

　律，在一個(gè)人民的道德觀念并不支持該法的，社會里，它們的執(zhí)行情況也許不次于任何一項(xiàng)法律所能達(dá)到的程度。在兩種情況下，絕大多數(shù)的人都遵守枯燥乏味的法律義務(wù)，但又都有少數(shù)人不聽那一套。關(guān)于這一點(diǎn)，我想，要徹底解決是根本不可能的；如果寸巴兩個(gè)地區(qū)分離。以后，情況只會更壞。對外奴隸貿(mào)易現(xiàn)在并未能完全加以禁止，最后在一個(gè)地區(qū)中必將全面恢復(fù)；對于逃亡奴隸，在另一個(gè)地區(qū)，現(xiàn)在送回的只是一部分，將來會完全不肯交出來了。

　就自然條件而言，我們是不能分離的。我們決不能把我們的各個(gè)地區(qū)相互搬開，也不可能在它們之間修建起一道無法逾越的高墻。一對夫妻可以離婚，各走各的路，彼此再不見面。但我們國家的各部分可無法這么辦。它們只能面對面相處，友好也罷。仇視也罷，他們?nèi)员仨毐舜私煌�。我們維道能有任何辦法使得這種交往在分離之后，比分離：之前更為有利，更為令，人滿意嗎?難道在外人之間訂立條約，比在朋友之間制訂法律還更為容易嗎?難道在外

　人之間履行條約，比在朋友之間按法律辦事還更忠實(shí)嗎?就算你們決定。訴諸戰(zhàn)爭，你們，總不能永遠(yuǎn)打下去吧；最后當(dāng)兩敗俱傷而雙方都一無所獲時(shí)，你們停止戰(zhàn)斗，那時(shí)依照什么條件相互交往，這同一個(gè)老問題仍會照樣擺在你們面前了。

　這個(gè)國家，連同它的各種機(jī)構(gòu)，都屬于居住在這里的人民。任何時(shí)候，他們對現(xiàn)存政府感到厭倦了，他們可以行使他們的憲法權(quán)利，改革這個(gè)政府，或者行使他們的革命權(quán)利解散它或者推翻它。我當(dāng)然知道，現(xiàn)在就有許多尊貴的、愛國的公民極于想修訂我們的憲法。盡管我自己不會那么建議，我卻也完全承認(rèn)他們在這個(gè)問題上的合法權(quán)利，承認(rèn)他們可以按照憲法所規(guī)定的兩種方式中的任何一種來行使這種權(quán)利；而且，在目前情況下，我不但不反對，而倒是贊成給人民一個(gè)公正的機(jī)會讓他們?nèi)バ袆印?/p>

　我還不禁要補(bǔ)充一點(diǎn)，在我看來，采取舉行會議的方式似乎更好一些，這樣可以使修訂方案完全由人民自己提出，而不是只讓他們?nèi)ソ邮芑蚓芙^一些并非特別為此目的而選出的一些人提出的方案，因?yàn)橐部赡苣切┓桨盖∏〔⒉皇撬麄冊敢饨邮芑蚓芙^的。我了解到現(xiàn)在已有人提出一項(xiàng)憲法修正案——這修正案我并沒有看到，但在國會中已經(jīng)通過了，大意說，聯(lián)邦政府將永遠(yuǎn)不再干涉各州內(nèi)部制度，包括那些應(yīng)服勞役者的問題。為了使我講的話不致被誤解，我現(xiàn)在改變我不談具體修正案的原來的打算，明確聲明，這樣一個(gè)條款，既然現(xiàn)在可能列入憲法，我不反對使它成為明確而不可改動的條文。

　合眾國總統(tǒng)的一切權(quán)威都來之于人民，人民并沒有授于他規(guī)定條件讓各州脫離出去的權(quán)力。人民自己如果要那樣干，那自然也是可以的；可是現(xiàn)在的行政當(dāng)局不能這樣做。他的職責(zé)，是按照他接任時(shí)的樣子管理這個(gè)政府，然后,毫無...

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