1991年春，我首次訪問華東師大。那時(shí)我認(rèn)識(shí)童世駿已有兩年。1991年我有幸愉快見到了華東師大的同事和學(xué)生，還見到了馮契教授。那以后我來過華東師大多次，也有一些來自上海的學(xué)者在卑爾根與我和我的同事見面。這十六年中，發(fā)生了許多變化，不只是上海和華東師大的變化。借此，我想對(duì)在此期間發(fā)展起來的合作和友誼表達(dá)我誠摯的感謝，也對(duì)我親眼目睹的中國和華東師范所取得的巨大成績表示敬意。

　　沒有什么比向年輕人教授哲學(xué)的任務(wù)那樣帶來回報(bào)和提升——年輕人在某個(gè)領(lǐng)域或?qū)W科中找到出路前，他們的頭腦還保持開放和富有好奇心。如果你問我，我說教授哲學(xué)是一項(xiàng)有意義和激動(dòng)人心的工作——同時(shí)也包含著巨大責(zé)任。我們對(duì)年輕人事實(shí)上做了什么呢？

　　我們希望做得最好。人們說：“年輕人需要的唯有愛”，這句話即便不十分正確，也一定程度為真。確實(shí)，教師必須喜愛他所談?wù)摰臇|西，也必須喜愛所交談的對(duì)象。若非如此，哲學(xué)就不起作用。因此教師必須確切知道他所談?wù)摰臇|西，知道如何對(duì)他人（以及和他人一起）進(jìn)行談?wù)�。熱愛智慧，如古希臘語——字義是“愛智”（“philo-sophia”）——這是哲學(xué)的要義，也是今天我們講座的要義。

　　因此，作為本次講座的主題，哲學(xué)教育，與以下問題相關(guān)：何為，為何，如何——以及為誰？先從為誰的問題開始：我今天關(guān)注的是哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育，是針對(duì)那些學(xué)生，他們既不打算成為特定領(lǐng)域的專業(yè)哲學(xué)家，也不抱有個(gè)人特定的哲學(xué)興趣——即我把注意力放在作為一般教化和通識(shí)教育的哲學(xué)上。

　　中國有悠久的影響深遠(yuǎn)的哲學(xué)傳統(tǒng)，我想這個(gè)主題對(duì)中國的教師教育精英體制而言有某種特定含義，如華東師大校園中央的石碑上就刻著警醒注目的校訓(xùn)：“求實(shí)創(chuàng)造，為人師表。”

　　但本次講座我主要涉及的是西方哲學(xué)的開端。此外，我將把注意力放在現(xiàn)代大眾體制框架中具有考試和學(xué)位的教育；
這意味著我不去關(guān)注一些特定的人際關(guān)系，這些關(guān)系或許是更深入地傳播德性和智慧所需的。

　　針對(duì)現(xiàn)代大學(xué)生的哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育問題是：教育的重點(diǎn)是什么？主題是什么？教學(xué)方式是什么？我不從教學(xué)法的問題著手，而把這個(gè)問題（“如何”）看成是關(guān)于針對(duì)這些學(xué)生哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育的主題應(yīng)該是什么和為什么的問題。

　　我也不從孤立的主題，盡管我們教育那些打算成為職業(yè)哲學(xué)家的學(xué)生時(shí)或許這么做。

　　在此，討論的是對(duì)年輕人的通識(shí)教育，為何，何為和如何這三個(gè)問題是相互聯(lián)系的。

　　對(duì)這些問題我們應(yīng)該采取什么進(jìn)路呢？一種回答如下：今天的年輕人生活在現(xiàn)代社會(huì)，現(xiàn)代社會(huì)意味著：知識(shí)型和分化的社會(huì)，具有不同的文化，宗教和世界觀。這一情景帶來一些與哲學(xué)有關(guān)的問題：

　　1）存在許多類型的知識(shí)，如與日常實(shí)踐和個(gè)人經(jīng)驗(yàn)相關(guān)的知識(shí)；
但現(xiàn)代社會(huì)許多重要的知識(shí)類型都建立在科學(xué)研究和學(xué)術(shù)研究的基礎(chǔ)上。但是，諸科學(xué)和人文科學(xué)分化為不同的學(xué)科和子學(xué)科，每個(gè)學(xué)科都借助自己的概念和方法思考，“篩選”它們的知識(shí)領(lǐng)域。簡言之，科學(xué)學(xué)科和學(xué)術(shù)學(xué)科是視角主義的。因此，有必要不斷反思的是，哪些學(xué)科與其它學(xué)科及我們生活世界的經(jīng)驗(yàn)相關(guān)，哪些沒有。

　　進(jìn)而，科學(xué)研究和學(xué)術(shù)研究的結(jié)果原則上是可錯(cuò)的，因此我們必須認(rèn)識(shí)到各種視角主義的知識(shí)也是不確定的。最后我們對(duì)什么算好的或差的科學(xué)研究或?qū)W術(shù)研究進(jìn)行持續(xù)爭論，并從那時(shí)起，對(duì)如何區(qū)分一邊的科學(xué)（以及人文科學(xué)）與另一邊的荒謬，區(qū)分的界限在哪兒展開持續(xù)爭論；
或更確切說我們該如何思考天文學(xué)與占星術(shù)的關(guān)系？如何對(duì)待達(dá)爾文主義與神創(chuàng)說，科學(xué)藥物治療與新紀(jì)元康復(fù)，或氣象學(xué)的天氣預(yù)報(bào)與巫術(shù)的預(yù)言之間的關(guān)系？

　　這一切表明，對(duì)諸科學(xué)和人文科學(xué)的哲學(xué)（科學(xué)哲學(xué)）（Wissenschaftsphilosophie）洞見應(yīng)成為我們社會(huì)哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育項(xiàng)目的一部分。科學(xué)研究和學(xué)術(shù)研究不能被看成獨(dú)斷的，即對(duì)各種理論問題給出一個(gè)確定準(zhǔn)確的答案，或被看成具有工具意義的安全可靠性，對(duì)各種實(shí)際問題給出一個(gè)最終的解決方案�？茖W(xué)研究和學(xué)術(shù)研究不應(yīng)被看成是剛才提到的“科學(xué)主義”意義上的，而應(yīng)被看成是可錯(cuò)的，但又是（有希望地）自我改進(jìn)的活動(dòng)，即“看成有組織的懷疑主義”（默頓）。

　　2）隨著知識(shí)和技術(shù)的科學(xué)發(fā)展，現(xiàn)代社會(huì)已經(jīng)無意識(shí)地產(chǎn)生了許多政治和道德挑戰(zhàn)，如關(guān)于生態(tài)自然的挑戰(zhàn)。因此我們已處在規(guī)范問題的領(lǐng)域，這些問題最終是哲學(xué)問題。

　　進(jìn)而，現(xiàn)代社會(huì)我們面臨著各種不同的文化和宗教的信仰傳統(tǒng)——其中有一些需要思想和體制的現(xiàn)代化，而另一些則早已與現(xiàn)代社會(huì)的體制性和科學(xué)反思性的預(yù)設(shè)相適應(yīng)。因此我們不僅遇到文化間和信仰間對(duì)話的問題，還遇到了除一神論神學(xué)與其它宗教，與不可知論，與無神論信仰之間的挑戰(zhàn)外，一神論宗教內(nèi)如猶太教，基督教和伊斯蘭教中相關(guān)原教旨主義者的挑戰(zhàn)，

　　這些挑戰(zhàn)是緊迫的，還包含著問題——即有關(guān)規(guī)范性論辯和概念分析的問題——這些問題尋求典型的哲學(xué)“處理”。簡言之，哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育中要包含道德哲學(xué)和政治哲學(xué)。

　　這一切使我們再次有理由回答青年大學(xué)生的哲學(xué)一般教化和通識(shí)教育的問題。

　　一旦我們面對(duì)這些現(xiàn)代挑戰(zhàn)（上述 1）和2）點(diǎn)），我們在強(qiáng)調(diào)哲學(xué)的角色和重要性時(shí)，還應(yīng)思考哲學(xué)在此方面能做什么和各種經(jīng)驗(yàn)科學(xué)，詮釋學(xué)，或神學(xué)，詩歌（文學(xué)）表達(dá)能做什么這兩者之間的關(guān)系。

　　這是關(guān)于諸科學(xué)和人文科學(xué)的哲學(xué)的自身問題（也是哲學(xué)自身批判性自我反思的問題）。但處理這些問題，光有哲學(xué)教育和訓(xùn)練不夠，還必須充分了解這些其它學(xué)科的知識(shí)領(lǐng)域和規(guī)范及存在的洞見領(lǐng)域。

　　但顯然有一些基本的規(guī)范問題要求得到哲學(xué)地“處理”——如對(duì)超越情境規(guī)范（調(diào)節(jié)沖突的基本形式）的可能的正當(dāng)性辯護(hù)問題，或?qū)Ω鞣N活動(dòng)，科學(xué)的或?qū)W術(shù)的，神學(xué)的或意識(shí)形態(tài)的活動(dòng)的基本預(yù)設(shè)不斷反思的問題。

　　討論對(duì)那些不打算成為職業(yè)哲學(xué)家的學(xué)生的哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育問題，對(duì)我們有什么蘊(yùn)意呢？我們的出發(fā)點(diǎn)是，有必要對(duì)知識(shí)型和分化的現(xiàn)代社會(huì)持基本的哲學(xué)取向，在此基礎(chǔ)上已經(jīng)蘊(yùn)含了既要把政治哲學(xué)和道德哲學(xué)，又要把諸科學(xué)和人文科學(xué)的哲學(xué)包括進(jìn)來的理由。

　　的確，這是些難題，在哲學(xué)入門階段也遇到如何處理的問題。

　　進(jìn)而，即便我們一開始從關(guān)于諸科學(xué)和人文科學(xué)的哲學(xué)或道德和政治哲學(xué)中相對(duì)具體的問題著手，仍有內(nèi)在理由說明我們最終仍會(huì)碰上基本的哲學(xué)問題。

　　直白講，我們馬上遇到康德的問題：我能知道什么？我應(yīng)該做什么？我期望什么？人是什么？（以及社會(huì)是什么？）我們知道，對(duì)這些問題哲學(xué)上有不同的觀點(diǎn)：人如何思考和應(yīng)該如何思考知識(shí)，道德和宗教，從而應(yīng)該如何思考自身，思考人類。例如，在知識(shí)論（認(rèn)識(shí)論）上，既有智者派對(duì)蘇格拉底，柏拉圖和亞里士多德，也有唯理論者，經(jīng)驗(yàn)論者和康德式進(jìn)路的支持者，以及各種語用學(xué)觀念和現(xiàn)象學(xué)家和詮釋學(xué)家等之間的爭論。政治哲學(xué)或道德哲學(xué)中也是如此。

　　換句話說，為了以哲學(xué)的方式工作，人們必須知道一套特定的立場和論辯。深層的哲學(xué)知識(shí)要求掌握對(duì)相關(guān)的不同可選進(jìn)路的知識(shí)。

　　用實(shí)踐術(shù)語說，這意味著人們不可避免被特定地引入哲學(xué)史：哲學(xué)和哲學(xué)史交織在一起。

　　但同樣，哲學(xué)史以不同的方式呈現(xiàn)。對(duì)年輕人的哲學(xué)教育來說，要求論辯式的講解，突出各種問題和主題的相關(guān)性和當(dāng)下利益，并把注意力放在重要的討論集上（如上面提到的智者派與蘇格拉底之間的討論，或唯理論者和經(jīng)驗(yàn)論者之間的討論，或中國哲學(xué)中類似的討論集）。

　　此外，學(xué)生在學(xué)習(xí)哲學(xué)史時(shí)最好還去閱讀特定的原始文本選本 ，這樣被提及的哲學(xué)家們是帶著各自不同的風(fēng)格和性情（或”氣質(zhì)“）被人傾聽（原本如此）的。

　　這一切應(yīng)該裝在教學(xué)的“行裝”中。在這個(gè)“行裝”中，在教師對(duì)哲學(xué)史的論辯式和以相關(guān)性為取向的講解基礎(chǔ)上，學(xué)生們還應(yīng)對(duì)他們感興趣的中心論題展開討論，把注意力放在重要的討論上，并附之以閱讀主要思想家的選本。

　　這是兩種進(jìn)路：即學(xué)生對(duì)始于此時(shí)此地思考的問題的討論和閱讀經(jīng)典文本（前一種進(jìn)路是“自下而上”，后一種是“自上而下），在評(píng)價(jià)這兩種進(jìn)路時(shí)要注意避免一維教化的危險(xiǎn)——學(xué)生或是沒有超越自己偏好（和偏見）而只根據(jù)偏好進(jìn)行討論，或被某個(gè)經(jīng)典作家（列寧，柏拉圖或�？拢┑乃枷胨�折服，認(rèn)為自己看到了唯一真理，那都會(huì)產(chǎn)生單面性。

　　認(rèn)真對(duì)待哲學(xué)，就必須熟知反證和其它可選的立場和思維方式。自我批判的反思是哲學(xué)所必須的，因此學(xué)生必須知道一套特定的話語情境，這套話語情境與他感興趣的問題相關(guān)。為了達(dá)到該目的，需要生動(dòng)的講座，教師要激發(fā)講座的興趣，把問題置于各種視角下，還需要編寫論辯式的哲學(xué)史講義，突顯被不同哲學(xué)家和哲學(xué)史不同話語情境所處理的問題的一般意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。

　　此外，我們在談?wù)撜軐W(xué)文本時(shí)，不只在所謂的“原始文本”和傳統(tǒng)的或多或少描述性的哲學(xué)史之間作出區(qū)分。

　　首先，也可以論辯式地編寫哲學(xué)史，強(qiáng)調(diào)哲學(xué)史對(duì)今天思想的意義。

　　其次，除了這種文本外，我們還有研究特定哲學(xué)家或哲學(xué)問題的學(xué)術(shù)書籍和文章——這是作為學(xué)術(shù)科學(xué)的哲學(xué)的領(lǐng)域。

　　再者，書籍或期刊中的文本合集代表了在世的當(dāng)代哲學(xué)家們在推動(dòng)特定討論向前中的高水平貢獻(xiàn)——這些討論或是關(guān)于以往哲學(xué)家的，或是在世的當(dāng)代哲學(xué)家之間的，如“某某人及批評(píng)者”一類的選集（參見《哈貝馬斯，批判的論爭》，及《羅蒂及其批評(píng)者》等）。

　　因而，哲學(xué)文本的多樣性比我們用“原始文獻(xiàn)”和“二手文獻(xiàn)”的區(qū)分所包含的蘊(yùn)意要豐富得多。

　　這里我們碰到了一個(gè)可稱為哲學(xué)的“位置”（希臘術(shù)語，哲學(xué)的場所(the topos of philosophy)）的棘手問題：什么是哲學(xué)？哲學(xué)在哪里？哲學(xué)在命題中（在著名思想家的命題中）？在特定的段落中？在經(jīng)典著作中？或在某個(gè)思想家的文本全集中？或在給定的文本全集所屬的話語情境中——情境某種程度由歷史情景產(chǎn)生，例如以政治或科學(xué)挑戰(zhàn)為特征的歷史情景？

　　關(guān)于哲學(xué)的“場所”的問題——即在哪里能找到哲學(xué)？——引導(dǎo)我們進(jìn)入基本的詮釋學(xué)問題。但由于我們現(xiàn)在討論的是哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育，我將只作兩點(diǎn)評(píng)述：

　　1） 的確，知曉所有這些“位置“（topi）是可取的——詳述命題和引文，仔細(xì)深入加以閱讀和解釋，或閱讀書籍或文章，理解部分和整體的相互關(guān)系，以及熟知真正思想家的整個(gè)文本全集都是有價(jià)值的。

　　2） 同樣有價(jià)值的是，從相關(guān)的商談和歷史的情境中看待文本（和思想家）。就我們的問題（青年哲學(xué)教育）而言，我認(rèn)為，把注意力放在商談和歷史的情境上，即思想家所處時(shí)代面臨的科學(xué)和政治挑戰(zhàn)，這尤為重要。以歐洲哲學(xué)史為例：

　　熟知柏拉圖或亞里士多德，笛卡兒，洛克或康德的文本對(duì)通識(shí)教育的確有用。但要理解康德，必須看到他正反兩面的“用意”，如他設(shè)法捍衛(wèi)自然科學(xué)（牛頓和因果律），以此反對(duì)他眼中的破壞性的懷疑主義（休謨的懷疑主義），同樣，他捍衛(wèi)的是與個(gè)人自律相關(guān)的（形式）道德，而非純粹感情的效用。簡言之，為了理解康德，我們必須理解他的商談?wù)Z境。

　　同樣，在看待象笛卡兒和斯賓諾莎這樣設(shè)法用某種公理體系構(gòu)造哲學(xué)的唯理論者時(shí)，也要將其置于以數(shù)學(xué)語言構(gòu)造的新興自然科學(xué)為特征的商談和歷史情境中。亞里士多德與柏拉圖及其他早期古希臘哲學(xué)家的商談關(guān)系，就如同柏拉圖對(duì)智者派的懷疑主義之間的關(guān)系，如果對(duì)此不加以考慮，就無法全面理解亞里士多德。

　　詮釋學(xué)的要點(diǎn)是：情境重要。是理解說了什么和為什么這樣說的問題。

　　我們或許會(huì)問：把思想家置于情境中，是否會(huì)把他們的洞見和主張相對(duì)化了？這視情況而定。借助這種情境化，我們能更好地理解說了什么和為什么這樣說。此外，這些思想家遇到的更深層的挑戰(zhàn)也是我們今天所遇到的——以康德為例，他面臨的挑戰(zhàn)是：如何協(xié)調(diào)自然知識(shí)，道德義務(wù)和宗教信仰這三者之間的關(guān)系？現(xiàn)代挑戰(zhàn)產(chǎn)生的問題是，康德的回應(yīng)是否對(duì)我們今天仍有意義：即對(duì)基本預(yù)設(shè)的反思分析是處理有關(guān)哲學(xué)問題的富有成效的方式？這些挑戰(zhàn)確實(shí)是現(xiàn)代（過于現(xiàn)代）挑戰(zhàn)——盡管對(duì)康德之后相關(guān)黑格爾或馬克思，基爾凱戈?duì)柣蚝５赂駹柕热说奶魬?zhàn)還可以說更多。

　　直白講：借助商談和歷史情境（尤其是科學(xué)和政治挑戰(zhàn)）來看待哲學(xué)，不僅有助于我們理解說了什么和什么成問題，而且也有助于我們看到嵌于這些哲學(xué)中的一些有效性主張，并對(duì)此采取積極的論辯態(tài)度。我們還可以說：對(duì)早期思想家所處的商談和歷史情境的關(guān)注也提醒我們注意自己的商談和歷史情境。

　　我們已經(jīng)在不同文本和情境中找到哲學(xué)的“位置”（topos）。但哲學(xué)和言說的作用是什么？

　　我們記得柏拉圖，這個(gè)偉大的作者，對(duì)文字表示懷疑（見第七封信）；
笛卡兒也大聲說，(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　他沒有從研究早期思想家著作中學(xué)到多少東西。因此哲學(xué)的位置或許主要不在圖書館的書架上，而確切說是在討論課上面對(duì)面的談話中，甚至在個(gè)體對(duì)哲學(xué)問題的（非書面）沉思中嗎？

　　顯然這些我們都需要，既需要文本，也需要對(duì)話（和個(gè)人沉思）。不是非此即彼，而是兩者都要。這點(diǎn)對(duì)哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育而言同樣重要。但在我們考察哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育的實(shí)踐意義之前，先把注意力放在兩個(gè)相關(guān)點(diǎn)上：

　　哲學(xué)文本是一回事。我們對(duì)文本的態(tài)度是另一回事。這里有一個(gè)對(duì)間接意圖和直接意圖（intention oblique and intention recta）的經(jīng)典區(qū)分，簡單說，是對(duì)描述性態(tài)度和取向問題的態(tài)度間的區(qū)分（理想類型區(qū)分），即：要么1）把文本及信息看成事實(shí)，是我們可以“擁有”的（如一項(xiàng)知識(shí)），可以向他人談?wù)摰模ㄈ缃處煂?duì)學(xué)生談?wù)摶蚩荚囍袑W(xué)生之間談?wù)摰模�，要�?）把文本及信息看成一項(xiàng)挑戰(zhàn)，我們應(yīng)設(shè)法對(duì)其作出批判性的積極評(píng)價(jià)，認(rèn)真對(duì)待其各種有效性主張。

　　寬泛地說，這種區(qū)別就如同兩類人的區(qū)別：1）一類人是研究海德格爾的專家，他在哲學(xué)和歷史層面對(duì)海德格爾本人和其著作了解甚多，和2）另一類人對(duì)海德格爾進(jìn)行私人地全面研究，認(rèn)真對(duì)待其主張后，確信海德格爾所說基本正確。兩者都是學(xué)者，或都是教師，但后者可能還是傳道者—優(yōu)秀或糟糕的!

　　第二類人的態(tài)度，優(yōu)點(diǎn)是認(rèn)真考慮了海德格爾的有效性的基本主張。但缺點(diǎn)是，我們已經(jīng)提過，缺乏對(duì)海德格爾思想的批判視角。（我們從約翰·密爾那里知道：我們只有向反證和其它可選的視角積極敞開時(shí)，才能自信于自己的觀點(diǎn)）。因此，對(duì)海德格爾思想（或被認(rèn)真對(duì)待的其他哲學(xué)家）的反思質(zhì)疑是哲學(xué)的內(nèi)在要求。進(jìn)而也就要求熟知相關(guān)的商談情境。對(duì)待象海德格爾這樣深刻的思想家，還隱含地要求合理熟知整個(gè)哲學(xué)的基本立場和思維方式（不僅是鄰近的現(xiàn)象學(xué)家和存在主義哲學(xué)家，還有例如賴爾和維特根斯坦這樣的分析哲學(xué)家）。

　　但在思考各種立場和思維方式的多元論的層面，也存在著對(duì)于描述態(tài)度和相關(guān)問題的態(tài)度之間的相似區(qū)分。在此，前種（描述性）態(tài)度會(huì)導(dǎo)向基本的懷疑論：存在各式各樣的情境化的哲學(xué),似乎無法獲得有效性和真理——因?yàn)檫@個(gè)問題本身也被情境化了！

　　相反，后種（相關(guān)問題）的態(tài)度把我們引向何方呢？引向深處——真正的哲學(xué)家會(huì)認(rèn)真對(duì)待與哲學(xué)立場和思維方式的多樣性有關(guān)的相關(guān)問題的態(tài)度，這種態(tài)度超出了對(duì)學(xué)者和哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育者的通常要求。與此同時(shí)，每個(gè)學(xué)習(xí)或教授哲學(xué)的人對(duì)于各種哲學(xué)立場和思維方式也應(yīng)該獲得一些批判性的基本洞見（如通過不斷討論和學(xué)習(xí)過程，邏輯實(shí)證主義的批評(píng)得到邏輯實(shí)證主義支持者的認(rèn)可）。對(duì)不同立場和思維方式既有外在批判，也有內(nèi)在批判，學(xué)習(xí)哲學(xué)的學(xué)生應(yīng)該思考這些批判。因此，存在可能改進(jìn)的基礎(chǔ)，對(duì)與可能和應(yīng)該達(dá)到的程度相比好得不夠的立場和思維方式加以揚(yáng)棄。通識(shí)層面上也存在真正哲學(xué)教育的基礎(chǔ)。

　　這再次要求積極商談的態(tài)度和實(shí)踐。顯然我們遇到一個(gè)決定性的教學(xué)要求，就如何向年輕人教授哲學(xué)而言：取向問題的態(tài)度和商談實(shí)踐。

　　我們從哲學(xué)教育的何為，為何和為誰的問題談起，現(xiàn)在再對(duì)如何的問題提些建議：

　　我們現(xiàn)在討論的是現(xiàn)代社會(huì)青年哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育，我強(qiáng)調(diào)對(duì)一套特定的歷史語境化的商談情境加以關(guān)注的重要性，在以論辯和以問題為取向方式講解并附之以原始文本選本（這取決于學(xué)生的能力程度）的哲學(xué)史中，這個(gè)商談情境是關(guān)鍵要素。同時(shí)，我強(qiáng)調(diào)，除了需要生動(dòng)的講座外，還需要在學(xué)生間開展生動(dòng)的討論，讓學(xué)生在教師指導(dǎo)下（并適合他們的需要和能力）經(jīng)歷個(gè)人寫作的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

　　簡言之，我建議教學(xué)的“行裝”里要包含各種活動(dòng)：讀，寫，說和聽——全部包含于持續(xù)的學(xué)習(xí)過程中（設(shè)想這種情況：人們只從事其中一項(xiàng)活動(dòng)：只讀不寫，只讀不說或不聽－只寫不讀，或只寫不說或不聽——只說不聽，或只說不讀或不寫——只聽不說，只聽不讀或不寫。這在理智上多么可怕！我猜測我們已經(jīng)在自己的智力環(huán)境中認(rèn)出這種傾向�。�

　　進(jìn)而，我建議在教授哲學(xué)史時(shí)教師要設(shè)法把對(duì)有效性問題的關(guān)心和對(duì)情境的關(guān)心結(jié)合起來：作為教師，我們應(yīng)首先注重問題，而非答案。如果不理解答案背后的問題，就無法得到可理解的有意義的答案。確實(shí)，哲學(xué)與工具性的學(xué)科如力學(xué)不同，工具性的學(xué)科是一次性地掌握基本問題（以及實(shí)踐運(yùn)用）。

　　在問題和答案之間我們有認(rèn)作是答案的各種支持論據(jù)——有各種各樣的哲學(xué)論據(jù)和觀點(diǎn)。

　　最后我們要考慮在基本或顯見問題背后的背景和預(yù)設(shè)，也要考慮被認(rèn)作是該語境的答案的蘊(yùn)意。

　　舉例說：據(jù)說古希臘哲學(xué)家泰勒斯說過，萬物是水。表面看，這個(gè)答案是荒謬的！但如果我們假定基本的問題是關(guān)于理解變化的問題，進(jìn)而是關(guān)于理解世界上發(fā)生之物的問題，假定水是呈現(xiàn)所有其它形式的基本要素——水首先變成冰或氣，然后變成其它事物——那蘊(yùn)意極為重要：既然我們在原則上能理解水——水是自然現(xiàn)象——那么我們也能理解宇宙萬物；
沒有任何東西可以在我們理解之上，沒有任何東西是神秘或不可理解的。簡言之，我們被準(zhǔn)許通過人類的考察來探究宇宙。從此，討論開始了。這是古希臘哲學(xué)的開端。

　　這一圖式——考察問題，理由和答案之間的相互作用，同時(shí)一邊把注意力放在背景和預(yù)設(shè)上，一邊把注意力放在蘊(yùn)意上——也有助于我們設(shè)法理解當(dāng)代思想家。例如，對(duì)阿佩爾和哈貝馬斯的關(guān)于有約束力的普遍規(guī)范的討論加以評(píng)價(jià)時(shí)無疑應(yīng)該考慮他們在二戰(zhàn)期間的經(jīng)歷。法國后現(xiàn)代主義者的思想也應(yīng)被置于法國的語境，法國有博學(xué)多才的高級(jí)知識(shí)精英（at 匯集在索邦大學(xué)，巴黎高等師范學(xué)校）和公共空間（圣米歇爾大道上從凡爾賽廣場到索邦大學(xué)），人們在此自認(rèn)為盡情表達(dá)著自己的觀點(diǎn)，盡管背后是雙重反思——因而，每個(gè)人都自以為是。但隨后這些文本傳到美國大學(xué)，成為“法國思想”課程閱讀清單上的嚴(yán)肅教科書，隨之產(chǎn)生了英語學(xué)術(shù)文章和書籍，再被引入到其他國家，被那些想跟上法國思想的人認(rèn)真閱讀！

　　因此，結(jié)論是，教學(xué)“行裝”有什么哲學(xué)的要求？我謹(jǐn)慎地指出以下幾點(diǎn)希望：

　　有必要獲得來自學(xué)習(xí)過程的教化和對(duì)熟知的哲學(xué)史和當(dāng)代哲學(xué)的商談情境中的各種立場和思維方式加以取向。

　　有必要通過通過仔細(xì)分析預(yù)設(shè)反思顯見和隱含的預(yù)設(shè)，反思既是重構(gòu)，又是批判。

　　有必要對(duì)運(yùn)用于各種語境中的概念加以仔細(xì)分析，，這些概念既被用于各種論辯，也被默會(huì)地用于日常事務(wù)。

　　這是一些相關(guān)有效性的哲學(xué)活動(dòng)。但此外有要關(guān)注哲學(xué)思維的創(chuàng)造性特征，就如提到的“重新描述”一詞（羅蒂用語，或海德格爾那里的“解蔽”）。

　　還要關(guān)注回溯性的進(jìn)路（如黑格爾說，以概念把握經(jīng)驗(yàn)）,以此設(shè)法闡明和重新解釋以往重要的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

　　最后要強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，哲學(xué)事實(shí)上是一項(xiàng)以不同工作方式進(jìn)行的多重工作。在此我們應(yīng)當(dāng)注意經(jīng)常以思想實(shí)驗(yàn)形式出現(xiàn)的例子的哲學(xué)運(yùn)用，借例子“表明”一些基本要點(diǎn),這些要點(diǎn)既不被經(jīng)驗(yàn)確認(rèn)，也不被邏輯證明，而對(duì)那些其觀點(diǎn)和洞見得到言說者認(rèn)可的人而言，這些例子也不只是教學(xué)范例。為了“找到”和“表明”以前沒有被看到或沒有以那種方式看到的觀點(diǎn)，我們可以在哲學(xué)中使用例子。

　　最后還要強(qiáng)調(diào)一點(diǎn)，通過敘事和自我學(xué)習(xí)過程，都能推進(jìn)哲學(xué)：敘事使我們改變視角或采取新的視角，自我學(xué)習(xí)過程則闡明我們看待世界的方式。

　　我們的問題是：現(xiàn)代社會(huì)的青年哲學(xué)通識(shí)教育。答案呢？一個(gè)理想的恰當(dāng)回答顯然要求甚高。但向青年學(xué)生教授哲學(xué)仍收獲頗豐，盡管我們作為教師無法遵循全部理想要求——只要我們確實(shí)喜愛從事的工作，喜愛談?wù)摰臇|西和與之談?wù)摰膶?duì)象，那就是回報(bào)。

　　對(duì)學(xué)生而言呢？我希望他們同樣能體驗(yàn)這種哲學(xué)教育的意義和重要性。

　　=============================================

　　Gunnar Skirbekk

　　www.uib.no/People/hsvgs

　　ECNU Shanghai

　　May 2007

　　(27.04.)

　　PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION

　　What, why, how – and for whom?

　　A lecture marking the publication of the book “Timely Thoughts” in Chinese

　　I first visited this university in the spring of 1991. At that time I had known Tong Shijun for a couple of years. And at that time (1991) I had the pleasure and honor of meeting colleagues and students at this campus, including Professor Feng Qi. Since then I have returned to East China Normal University several times, and some scholars from Shanghai have visited me and my colleagues in Bergen. In these 16 years much has changed, not least in Shanghai and at East China Normal University. And at this occasion I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the collaboration and friendship that has developed during this period, and my admiration for the great achievements that I have witnessed in your country and at your campus.

　　Few things are as rewarding and uplifting as the task of teaching philosophy to young people – when they still are open and not blasé, before they have found their way, in some field or discipline. A meaningful and exciting task, if you ask me – but also involving great responsibility. What are we doing to them, really?

　　 We hope for the best. And even if it is not quite true, as it is said: “All they need is love”, it is certainly true that a teacher has to like that which one is talking about and to like those one is talking to. If not, it won’t work. And then one certainly has to know what one is talking about and know how to talk about it, to (and with) the others. Love for wisdom, as the old Greek said – literally “philo-sophia” – and that’s what it is all about, also here.

　　So, philosophical education, that is the theme for this lecture – related to the questions: what, why, how – and for whom? And to start with the latter question: My focus today is general philosophical education,(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　 philosophical education for students who do not intend to become professional philosophers within some special field, nor for those who have a personal and special philosophical interest that they want to pursue – that is, my focus is philosophy as a general formation and education.

　　And this is a theme, I assume, with some special relevance for an elite institution for the education of teachers in a country with a long and impressive philosophical tradition, a university like East China Normal University, that even has an amazing and urgent appeal, carved in stone, in the midst of its campus: “seek truth, foster originality, and live up to the name of teacher”.

　　However, in this lecture I shall primarily refer to what at the outset was seen as western philosophy. Moreover, I shall focus on education within the framework of modern mass institutions, with exams and degrees; this implies that I shall not focus on the special interpersonal relationships that probably are required for a deeper transmission of virtues and wisdom.

　　General philosophical education for young people in modern universities: What is the point? What is the topic? What is the way of teaching? I shall not start with the pedagogical question, but conceive this question (“how”) from the point of view of what the topic should be, and why, for these students.

　　Nor shall I start with the topic, taken isolatedly, as we might have done in cases of educating those who are going to be professional philosophers.

　　In our case, general education for young people, these three questions are interconnected: why, what and how.

　　How should we approach these questions? One answer goes as follows: Young people today live in modern societies, and here we take this to mean: in knowledge-based and differentiated societies, with different cultures, religions and world views. This situation gives rise to several philosophically related questions:

　　(i) There are many kinds of knowledge, for instance related to everyday practices and personal experiences; but in modern societies many important kinds of knowledge are based on scientific and scholarly research. However, the sciences and the humanities are differentiated into various disciplines and subdisciplines, each of them conceiving, “screening”, their field of knowledge by their own notions and methods. In short, scientific and scholarly disciplines are perspectivistic. Thus there is a need for an ongoing reflection on what the various disciplines can and cannot yield, in relation to each other and to our life-world experiences. Moreover, the results of scientific and scholarly research are in principle fallible, and hence we have to realize that the various kinds of perspectivistic knowledge are also uncertain. And finally we have the ongoing debate on what counts as scientifically and scholarly good or bad research, and from there on, how and where the border should be drawn between the sciences (and the humanities) on the one hand and nonsense on the other; or rather how should we conceive the relationship between astronomy and astrology? And what about Darwinism versus creationism, science-based medicine versus New Age healing, or meteorological weather-forecast versus prophecies based on witchcraft?

　　 All in all this means that insight in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities (Wissenschaftsphilosophie) should be part of a general educational program in philosophy in our societies. And scientific and scholarly research should not be conceived as being dogmatic, i.e. as giving the one right and certain answer to theoretical questions, or as being instrumentally safe and secure, giving the one and final solution to various practical problems. Scientific and scholarly research should not be conceived “scientistically” in the sense just mentioned, but rather be conceived as a fallible, but (hopefully) self-improving activity, i.e. “as organized skepticism” (Merton).

　　(ii) Modern societies, with a science-based development of knowledge and technology, have unintendedly given rise to many political and moral challenges, e.g. of an ecological nature. Thereby we are already within the realm of normative questions, questions that in a decisive sense are philosophical.

　　Furthermore, in modern societies we encounter a large field of different cultural and religious convictions and traditions – some of these will need an intellectual and institutional modernization, while others have long ago adapted to the institutional and scientific and reflective presuppositions of modern societies. Hence we are faced with problems of inter-cultural and inter-convictional dialogues, but also, for instance, with challenges related to fundamentalist convictions in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, as well as between these monotheistic theologies and other religions and agnostic and atheistic convictions.

　　 These are urgent challenges, and they include questions – e.g. concerning normative argumentation and conceptual analyses – that ask for typically philosophical “treatments”.(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　 In short, moral and political philosophy should be included.

　　All in all, here again we have a reasonable answer to the question about the point of a general philosophical formation and education for young people at our universities.

　　In emphasizing the role and importance of philosophy, once we are faced with these modern challenges (point i and ii above), we should at the same time consider the relationship between what philosophy can do in this respect and what can be done by the various empirical sciences and hermeneutic disciplines, or by theology, or by poetic (literary) expressions.

　　These are themselves questions of the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities (and of the critical self-reflection of philosophy itself). But in coping with such questions it is not sufficient to be philosophically trained and educated, one also has to be sufficiently knowledgeable about these other fields of knowledge and of normative and existential insights.

　　But apparently there are basic normative questions that do require a philosophical “treatment” – such as the question of a possible justification of context-transcending norms (for the regulation of basic forms of conflict) or the question of an ongoing reflection on basic presuppositions in various activities, be they scientific or scholarly, or be they theological or ideological.

　　What are the implications for us, discussing the question of a general philosophical education for students who do not intend to become philosophers by profession? Well, we took our point of departure in the need for basic philosophical orientation in modern knowledge-based and differentiated societies, and on this background we have indicated why we should include philosophy of the sciences and the humanities as well as political and moral philosophy.

　　To be sure, these are difficult questions, and it remains to find out how they could be coped with on an introductory level.

　　 Moreover, even when we start with relatively concrete questions in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities, or in moral and political philosophy, there are immanent reasons why we may easily end up with basic philosophical questions.

　　Bluntly stated, we may soon encounter the Kantian questions: What can I know? What shall I do? What dare I hope for? What is Man? (And what is society?) And as we know, within philosophy there are different views on these questions, on how knowledge, morality and religion can and ought to be conceived – and thereby on how we should conceive of ourselves, of Man. For instance, within the theory of knowledge (epistemology) we do not merely have the Sophists versus Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, but also the discussions between rationalists, empiricists and proponents of a Kantian approach, as well as pragmatic conceptions of various kinds, and phenomenologists and hermeneuticians, etc. And similarly for political or moral philosophy.

　　In other words, in order to work philosophically one has to know a certain repertoire of positions and argumentations. In philosophy knowledge in-depth requires knowledge of relevant alternative approaches.

　　In practical terms this means that one cannot avoid a certain introduction into the history of philosophy; philosophy and the history of philosophy are intertwined.

　　But again, the history of philosophy could be presented in different ways. What is needed here, for the education in philosophy for young people, is an argumentative presentation that at the same time gives prominence to the relevance and current interest of the various questions and topics, and that focuses on important clusters of discussion (like the ones just mentioned, between Sophists and Socrates or between rationalists and empiricists, or similar clusters of discussion in Chinese philosophy).

　　Furthermore, when studying the history of philosophy the students should ideally also read a certain selection of original texts, so that the philosophers referred to could make themselves heard (as it were), with their different style and “temperature” (or “spirit”).

　　 All of this should be given in a pedagogical “package”: In such a “package” the students should also be engaged in discussing central topics that they find interesting, on the background of an argumentative and relevance-oriented presentation of the history of philosophy, focusing on central discussions and supplemented with selected texts of major thinkers.

　　 These two approaches, discussion among the students, starting with problems as they are conceived here and now, and reading of classical texts (one approach “bottom up” and the other “top down”, as it were), should be assessed with respect to the danger of a one-dimensional formation – a one-sidedness that may occur if one merely discusses on the background of one’s own preferences without transcending one’s own preferences (and pre-judices), or if one becomes so overwhelmed by some classical author (be it Lenin, Plato or Foucault) that one thereby believes to have seen the light for all times,(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　 the one and only truth.

　　 Taking philosophy seriously one has to be acquainted with counter-arguments and alternative positions and ways of thinking. Self-critical reflection is philosophically necessary, and hence one has to know a certain repertoire of discursive contexts with relevance to the questions that one finds interesting. For this purpose there is a need for live lectures, for motivating lectures that put problems in perspectives, and for written presentations from the history of philosophy that are argumentative and that highlight the general and present importance of the problems dealt with by various philosophers and in various discursive contexts of the history of philosophy.

　　Moreover, in talking about philosophical texts we do not merely have the distinction between so-called “original texts” and traditional, more or less descriptive histories of philosophy.

　　Firstly, a history of philosophy may also be written argumentatively and with an emphasis on its relevance for today’s thinking.

　　Secondly, in addition to these kinds of texts we also have scholarly books and articles on certain philosophers or philosophical problems – this is the domain for philosophy as a scholarly discipline.

　　Thirdly, there are collections of texts, in books or journals, presenting high quality contributions from various living philosophers to certain ongoing discussions – this might be discussions about certain past philosophers, or it might be discussions between living philosophers, as in anthologies of the kind “so-and-so and his Critics” (cf Habermas, Critical Debates, and Rorty and his Critics, etc.).

　　Hence the variety of philosophical texts is far richer that what is indicated when we talk in terms of a distinction between “original literature” and “secondary literature”.

　　Here we touch upon the tricky question of what we might call the “place” of philosophy (the topos of philosophy, to use the Greek term): What, and where, is philosophy? In a statement (be it of a famous thinker)? In a certain paragraph? In a classical work? Or in the whole textual corpus of a thinker? Or rather in a discursive context to which a given textual corpus belongs – a discursive context that somehow is impregnated by a historical situation, for instance characterized by political or scientific challenges?

　　 This question about the “topos” of philosophy – where is philosophy to be found? – leads us into basic hermeneutic problems. But for our purpose, the question of general philosophical education, I shall just make a couple of comments:

　　(i) Yes, it is desirable to be aware of all these “places” (topoi) – it is worthwhile dwelling upon statements and quotes, to read and interpret them cautiously and in depth, it is worthwhile reading books or articles, to get an understanding of the interrelationship between parts and wholes, and it is worthwhile getting acquainted with the whole textual corpus of a genuine thinker.

　　(ii) But it is also worthwhile to see a text (and a thinker) in relation to relevant discursive and historical contexts. And for our question (the education in philosophy for young people) I think it is especially important to pay attention to the need for an emphasis on the discursive contexts and historical contexts, e.g. contexts in terms of scientific and political challenges in the time of the thinker. To take a few examples from European history of philosophy:

　　It is certainly valuable for those who seek a general philosophical education to get acquainted with texts from Plato or Aristotle, or Descartes or Locke or Kant. But to understand Kant, one has to see “what he is driving at”, negatively and positively, for instance his attempt to defend natural science (Newton and causality, as Kant saw it) against what he conceived of as an undermining skepticism (in Hume), and similarly his defense of a (formal) morality connected to personal autonomy, and not to utility of mere emotions. In short, in order to understand Kant, we have to get an understanding of his discursive setting.

　　Similarly it is important to see rationalists like Descartes and Spinoza, trying to formulate philosophy in terms of some kind of an axiomatic system, in a discursive and historical context characterized by the emerging natural sciences, formulated in a mathematical language. And Aristotle can hardly be fully understood without his discursive relationship to Plato and other early Greek thinkers, just as Plato is situated in arguing against the skepticism of the Sophists. Or take Locke’s political philosophy, based on individuals and contracts, with its background in a new historical situation and with its impacts on later thinkers. And similar points can be made for Chinese and Indian philosophy.

　　These are hermeneutic points: the context matters. It is a question of understanding what is said and why.

　　Then we may ask: By situating these thinkers in these terms, do we thereby relativize their insights and claims? Well, it depends.(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　 At the same time, everybody studying or teaching philosophy should acquire some basic critical insights concerning various philosophical positions and ways of thinking (like the ones against logical positivism, recognized by the proponents themselves, after ongoing discussions and learning-processes). There are internal as well as external criticisms of various positions and ways of thinking, criticisms that should be considered by any student of philosophy. Hence, there is also a basis for possible improvements, for an effort to overcome what is less well established than it could and should be. Hence there is a basis for real philosophical education, also at a general level.

　　 But again, this requires an active and discursive attitude, and practice. And hence we are evidently faced with a decisive pedagogical requirement, a requirement as to how to teach philosophy for young people: a problem-oriented attitude and a discursive practice are required.

　　From the what, why, and for whom, we have now come to some recommendations as to the how:

　　 In our context, aiming at a general philosophical education for young people in modern societies, I will emphasize the value of a focus on a certain repertoire of historically situated discursive contexts, that is, a strong element of the history of philosophy, presented in an argumentative and problem-oriented way, and supplemented with selected original texts (depending on the capabilities of the students). Simultaneously I will emphasize the need for live lectures as well as working groups with live discussions among students and with personal writing-experiences for the students, under supervision (and adapted to their needs and capabilities).

　　 In short, I would recommend a pedagogical “package” containing various activities: reading, writing, talking and listening – all together in an ongoing learning-process. (Think of situations where people mainly do one of these things: either read, without writing, nor talking or listening – or write, without reading, nor talking or listening – or talk, without listening, nor reading or writing – or listen, without talking, nor reading or writing. For sure, an intellectual horror! And still I guess that we recognize some tendencies of this kind, in our own intellectual environment!)

　　 Furthermore I would recommend, for instance in teaching the history of philosophy, that one tries to bring together the concern for validity-questions and the concern of situatedness: As teachers we should first of all pay attention to questions, not to the answers, since what might be conceived as answers is hardly intelligible and meaningful without an understanding of the kind of question that lies behind. Here, for sure, philosophy is different from instrumental disciplines, like mechanics, where the underlying questions (as well as the practical applications) are learnt once for all.

　　And between the question and the answer we have the arguments that are supposed to support that answer – and philosophical arguments, and points, are of various kinds.

　　Finally we should consider the background and preconditions behind the underlying or explicit questions, and also the implications of the answer as it is conceived in this setting.

　　To take an example: Thales, the old Greek philosopher, is supposed to have said that everything is water. Taken at face value, a nonsensical answer! But if we assume that the underlying question is that of understanding change, and thus of understanding what is happening in the world, and assuming that water is seen as the basic element that can take on all other shapes – firstly by becoming ice or damp, and secondly by becoming all other things – then the implication is immensely important: Since we in principle can understand water – it is a natural phenomenon – we can also, consequently, understand everything in the universe; nothing is beyond our understanding, nothing is magic or unintelligible. In short, we are given a license for an exploration of the universe through human inquiry! And from there, the discussion went on. This was the beginning of Greek philosophy.

　　 This scheme – looking at the interplay between question, reasons, and answer, and also focusing on the background and the preconditions on the one hand and the implications on the other – may also be of help in our effort to understand contemporary thinkers. For instance, the experiences of the Second World War should definitely be taken into account in assessing the discussion on universally binding norms in Apel and Habermas. And French post-modernist thinking should be seen in a French setting, with a highly intellectual elite (say, at Sorbonne, or at Ecole Normale Supérieure), where everybody knows everything, and a public space (say, across Place de la Sorbonne, on Boulevard St. Michel) where one is supposed to express oneself sharply, though with a kind of double reflection behind it – hence everybody taking it for what it is. But then these texts are exported to some university campus in the US,(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　 becoming compulsory reading on some reading-list on “French Thought”, leading to scholarly articles and books in English, which again are imported elsewhere in the world, and read seriously by those who want to keep up with French thinking!

　　So, as a conclusion, what is needed philosophically, for this pedagogical “package”? Let me cautiously point at the following desiderata, as I see them:

　　 There is a need for a formation through learning processes and an orientation through an acquaintance with a certain repertoire of different positions and ways of thinking, by discursive contexts from the history of philosophy, and from contemporary philosophy.

　　 There is a need for reflection on explicit and implicit preconditions, in terms of cautious analyses of presuppositions, a reflection that may be critical as well as reconstructive.

　　 There is a need for cautious analyses of concepts, as they are used in various settings, tacitly in everyday dealings as well as in argumentation of various kinds.

　　 These are validity-related philosophical activities. But in addition there is a need for a focus on the creative aspect of philosophical thinking, as it is alluded to with the term “redescription” (in Rorty, or Welterschlie?ung in Heidegger).

　　 And there is a need for a focus on a retrospective approach (as in Hegel, “bringing experiences on concept”), whereby one tries to articulate and reappropriate important experiences of the past.

　　 Finally it is worthwhile underlining that philosophy is indeed a multifarious endeavor, taking different ways of working. In this connection we should pay attention to the philosophical usage of examples, often in terms of thought-experiments, whereby some basic points are “shown”, not empirically confirmed nor logically proven, and nor are these examples just pedagogical illustrations for other people of points and insights already recognized by the speaker. In philosophy we may also use examples in order to “find out” and “show” points that earlier are not seen or seen in that way.

　　 Finally it is also worthwhile underlining that philosophy may proceed by narratives, making us see some points from another angle, possibly in a new perspective, or by explicating how one sees the world, by referring to aspects of one’s own learning-process.

　　This was our question: general philosophical education, for young people in a modern society. And the answer? Ideally, an appropriate response is evidently quite demanding. But still the philosophical education of young students is highly rewarding, even when we as teachers are unable to live up to all the ideal requirements – it is rewarding as long as we really like what we are doing, what we are talking about and those to whom and with whom we are talking.

　　And for the students? Hopefully they too would experience this kind of a philosophical education as meaningful and important.

　�。�2007年5月16日于華東師范大學(xué)演講，來源：思與文）

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